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ABSTRACT 
The first part of this thesis will map the requirements and best practices for performing 
criticality classification, maintenance and inspection analyses leading to the establishment of 
preventive maintenance and inspection programs. Over the last decade or so the recognition 
of IO has brought increasing use of information and communication technology to the NCS 
making it possible to transfer vast amounts of real time data through high speed fiber cables 
between off- and onshore installations. This has led to increasing use of condition monitoring 
technology giving operators the possibility to detect degradations at an earlier stage. 
Emerging from this technology is the development of integrated information systems like the 
TIMS maintenance portal; a web-based decision support portal for managers, planners and 
decision makers giving access to a wide range of maintenance related information from 
multiple sources. The TIMS maintenance portal will be introduced and further exemplified in 
a case study of a water injection system, proposing a way to use real-time and offline 
technical condition data for visualizing the technical condition of the WI system in the TIMS 
maintenance portal interface. 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This thesis was written during the spring of 2011, as the final project of the master education 
“Structures and Materials” at the University of Stavanger (UiS). The project‟s objectives were 
given by Aker Solutions, and the thesis has been written in cooperation with them at their 
offices in Bergen.  
1.1 Aker Solutions  
Aker Solutions (denoted AS) has more than 40 years of experience for providing asset 
engineering, maintenance and modification solutions to the oil and gas industry. The company 
have executed major projects world-wide, and has developed oil and gas installations ranging 
from large complex installations in the deep and hostile North Sea environment, to facilities in 
arctic areas with small and marginal fields in shallow waters. By investing in research and 
development, AS has become one of the leading actors for using information technology, 
having continuously encouraged and developed new and cost-effective working relations with 
clients. Long-term design and maintenance experience is systematized into comprehensive 
maintenance and inspection services. The company aims to stay in the forefront of technology 
as one of the world's leading engineering organizations (AS Document 5, 2010). 
 
1.1.1 The TIMS alliance 
With the constant focus on performing safer, more reliable and environmental friendly oil and 
gas (O&G) activities developing new ways of operating and maintaining the assets is 
becoming ever more important. With the aim of developing more effective methods for 
managing the technical integrity of topside process equipment, AS have formed an alliance 
with SKF and IBM; offering Technical Integrity Management Services (TIMS). TIMS is a 
multidisciplinary service that unites multidiscipline knowledge from its participants; AS is 
specialist for inspection and condition monitoring of static process equipment, SKF is a 
leading provider of condition monitoring systems for rotating equipment and IBM contribute 
with their Integrated Information Core (IIC) technology, enabling information transfer 
between various databases, control systems and condition monitoring instruments. Through 
this multidisciplinary alliance TIMS aim to ensure the fit-for-purpose condition of assets, 
satisfy production targets while keeping a high focus on HSE. With this, the intention is to 
develop a decision support portal for managers, planners and decision makers, giving access 
to a wide range of maintenance related information from multiple sources.  
1.2 Background 
Today, the process for planning inspection and maintenance activities are extensively done 
separate, based on different criteria, measures and input data. The inspection and maintenance 
activities are relatively fixed based on risk-based inspection (RBI) and reliability centered 
maintenance (RCM) analyses respectively. With the implementation of Integrated Operations 
(IO) in this process, integrating inspection plans, maintenance plans, process and real-time 
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data from condition monitoring sensors in the field, the intention is to improve the inspection 
and maintenance planning by utilizing right time monitoring of significant influence factors, 
increase the use of condition based maintenance (CBM) and enable more dynamic risk 
assessments. Through the IIC technology the TIMS portal is intended integrate multi-source 
maintenance-related information into one portal interface; with the intention of presenting the 
right information to the right people in a more effective manner. This integrated access to 
multiple information sources is believed to significantly reduce the time spent searching for 
relevant information and instead give more time for evaluation and making better informed 
decisions. In turn this will bring lowered maintenance costs and increased availability of the 
installation.  
1.3 Thesis Objectives: 
To create a basis for addressing future developments of maintenance and inspection practices, 
the first part of this thesis will map today‟s requirements and best practices for maintenance 
and inspection engineering in accordance to supervisory authority requirements, industry 
standards and AS internal procedures. 
 
Further, the thesis will present the structure and features of the TIMS maintenance portal, and 
examine what types of information are most relevant for effective visualization of higher level 
condition status to best enable planning and decision-making of maintenance and inspection 
activities. To limit the scope of this task, a case study will be performed to exemplify the 
TIMS portal with the basis of a topside water injection (WI) system. The focus of the case 
study will be on selected static and rotating equipment within the WI system, and how real-
time and offline technical condition data can be used to visualize the system technical 
condition status in the TIMS maintenance portal.  
1.4 Limitations 
Data integration and interoperability between condition monitoring systems is a vital part of 
condition based maintenance systems, including the TIMS maintenance portal. However, this 
thesis will not focus on the technical details of this technology and will only provide an 
introductory presentation of the recognized standards and industry initiatives within this area. 
The TIMS maintenance portal is intended to cover a wide range of equipments and systems 
on an O&G platform with objective of increasing the total availability of the plant. As the 
relevant maintenance information will vary between the different systems and equipments, 
this thesis will only address the information relevant for the static and rotating equipment in a 
WI system. Performance indicators are only addressed according to the technical aspect; 
neither economic nor organizational considerations are addressed.  
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1.5 Methodology 
To create a foundation for addressing the objectives of this thesis, relevant document, 
procedures and presentations was gathered from Aker Solutions‟ internal database. Technical 
literature from books and academic articles was collected from the UiS library and also 
relevant online websites. Meetings and discussions with my supervisors and other 
experienced personnel at Aker Solutions have provided important contributions to the writing 
and direction of the thesis. Visiting Statoil‟s condition monitoring (CM) centre and meeting 
with Mr. Gunnar Ølmheim (Head of Rotating Machinery and Condition Monitoring, Statoil) 
and Mr. Trygve Marken (Chief Engineer, Rotating Machinery, Statoil) (Appendix A)  
provided valuable insight to the current practice of CM and condition based maintenance 
within the O&G industry, and also some further inputs regarding their future thoughts and 
perceptions for implementing planning and decision support systems similar to the TIMS 
maintenance portal.    
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2 FIELD STUDY 
2.1 Integrated Operations 
Integrated Operations (IO) is a term for describing the new work processes emerging from the 
increasing use of information and communication technology (ICT) in the O&G industry. IO 
is a tool for improving the efficiency and interaction between disciplines and decision makers, 
regardless of their geographical location, through extensive use of real-time data and 
communication technology (Krokeide, 2008). Various O&G companies have developed their 
own definitions of IO, all giving roughly the same message through different formulations. 
OLF (2007) defines IO within these three points: 
 
 Improve work-, decision- and implementation processes through use of modern ICT and 
real-time data, and thereby increase the level of HSE, increase added value and reduce 
financial costs. 
 Integrate skills, tools and data in real time to achieve safer, faster and higher quality 
decision making through interaction.  
 Improved utilization of skills – across disciplines, locations and organizations with the 
purpose of increasing the efficiency of exploration, development and operations through 
new ways of working. 
 
 
Figure 2.1, IO on the NCS, (Langeland, 2007) 
 
 
Consequently, the continuous stream of real time data between offshore and onshore 
installations brings new possibilities for close cooperation between distant geographic 
locations. This means that a lot of activities previously performed offshore now are performed 
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onshore. Expert consultations, problem evaluations, work planning and decision making can 
be done in Onshore Operation Center‟s (OOC) by multi-discipline expert teams with real time 
access to a wide range of information. This is believed to result in safer, faster and more 
informed decisions, in addition to lowering the risks and financial costs by reducing the 
manning on offshore installations. A report published by OLF (2007) estimated the added 
values from IO on the NCS to be in the range of 300 Billion NOK NPV. Needless to say these 
are huge numbers that somewhat illustrates the possible benefits of moving towards a more 
integrated approach, utilizing modern ICT and new work processes.  
 
Consequently IO brings new ways of operating and offer potentials for significant operational 
cost reductions. This is becoming increasingly important as the maturing fields on the NCS 
are reaching their tail end production phases; making the reduction of operational expenses 
(OPEX) vital for extending the economical lifetime. As tail end O&G production is 
approaching the maintenance activities will form bigger and bigger parts of the total cost 
needed to keep the production facilities operational (Kumar, Panesar, & Markeset, 2009). 
This has induced the need for O&G companies to streamline and modernize their operations 
and maintenance concepts in order to lower the OPEX and thereby extending the production 
periods of the installations (Figure 2.2).  
 
 
Figure 2.2, Extending the production period by lowering OPEX‟es, (Kumar, Panesar, & Markeset, 2009). 
 
In addition to declining O&G production, many of the aging installations on the NCS are 
approaching the end of their intended design life. As a result of this, many installations will 
experience increasing failure rates (bathtub curve phenomenon), resulting in higher risks to 
health, safety, environment (HSE) and economy (Ratnayake and Toreset, 2010). As a result 
from this, O&M activities must be performed at even higher levels of quality to assure that the 
technical integrity of the installations is in compliance with ever more stringent HSE 
requirements, while at the same time consequently be performed at lowered costs for 
extended production periods. 
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2.2 Asset Integrity (AI) 
The term “integrity” means being in a state of undiminished, unimpaired or perfect condition 
(Ratnayake and Toreset, 2010). Asset integrity (AI) is defined as “the inherent ability of an 
asset to perform its duty at specified technical, operational and business requirements in spite 
of any internal and/or external intentional or unintentional influence or action” (CIAM, 
2008). Asset Integrity Management (AIM) seeks to ensure a consistent performance 
throughout the assets lifetime in order to deliver the business objectives profitably and 
without major accidents (Risktec, 2010). The concept tries to optimize labour, tools, 
equipment, materials and information by integrating financial and human resources together 
with production, materials and enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems (Dilger, 1997). 
However, having well developed procedures and work processes does not guarantee for the 
successful implementation of AIM. It is also critically dependant of top-level management 
support, common understanding of risk across the organization, access to high quality 
information for making informed decisions and also regular reviews/analyses for continuous 
improvement. All stages of the assets life cycle must focus on integrity, from the design stage 
to maintenance management to decommissioning. Figure 2.3 illustrates the integral parts of 
Asset Integrity.  
 
 
Figure 2.3, Components of Asset Integrity (Erstad, 2011)  
 
 Design Integrity;  
 Design is based on calculations, simulations and analyses that confirm the assets ability 
to fulfill the required levels of safety and functionality throughout the intended lifetime.  
 Operational Integrity;  
 Assets are operated through defined operational envelopes without compromising the 
assets acceptable limits.  
 Technical Integrity;  
 Sustaining an acceptable condition of assets through maintenance, inspection and testing 
activities. 
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The technical integrity (TI) of facilities, systems or equipment is consequently the condition 
that allows them (when properly operated, assured, maintained, monitored and modified) to 
perform their intended function within design limits, whilst keeping risks to personnel, assets 
or the environment as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) (AS Document 6, 2011). High-
level TI can be ensured by assigning the most optimal maintenance strategies to the different 
systems and components in an O&G facility. However, ensuring and managing TI over time 
is dependent on the organization‟s management and its ability to implement and execute the 
operational and maintenance strategies.  
2.2.1 Technical Integrity Management 
Ratnayake and Toreset (2010) define Technical Integrity Management (TIM) as “the 
management of physical assets with well trained (competent) personnel in accordance with 
sound recognized practices and procedures whilst predefined threshold limits are unimpaired 
through protecting societal health and safety, and natural environment whilst optimizing the 
return on investment”. Reaching the highest possible level of HSE is one of the main targets 
of TIM. This means that O&G production facilities is operated and maintained in ways that 
HSE risks are identified, analyzed and eliminated or mitigated down to acceptable levels 
(Kumar, Panesar, & Markeset, 2009). TIM is performed by multi-discipline personnel 
covering the expertise needed for assuring the company goals defined in the operational and 
maintenance strategies. TI assurance is also vitally dependant on access to quality data and 
information, as well as models, tools and methods for analyses and assistance in decision-
making processes. From this the intention is to maximize the assets availability and efficiency 
by ensuring the condition and controlling the rate of deterioration in order to execute safe and 
environmental friendly operations with minimized financial costs (Ratnayake and Toreset, 
2010). Such objectives are also concurrent with the main objectives for IO; ensuring the safest 
ways of conducting O&G activities while minimizing operational expenses and maximizing 
added values.  
 
All systems and equipments will inevitably be exposed to degrading mechanisms during their 
operational lifetime. In order to manage and maintain an acceptable level of TI, competent 
personnel working to defined standards within a management framework is consequently 
required. The TI of a plant echoes from how management and strategies are implemented and 
executed by the organization, and is therefore dependant on effective methods and quality 
work processes. Figure 2.4 illustrates the maintenance management process and its 
components, a model well known within the O&G industry for managing and continuously 
improving the maintenance activities on O&G installations.  
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Figure 2.4, Maintenance Management Loop, AS Document 4 (2003) 
 
Resources in form of the maintenance organization/personnel, materials and support 
documentation are the enterprise input factors to the work processes in the management loop 
(Øien & Schjølberg, 2007). The input resources are managed with the objective of producing 
the desired outputs that is measured by the plant‟s technical integrity and the corresponding 
level of risk, regularity and costs. This will imply that the facilities are “capable of carrying 
out their intended functions in all phases of their lifetime” cf. the Norwegian Petroleum Safety 
Authority (denoted PSA) regulations relating to conducting petroleum activities (the 
Activities Regulations) section 45 on maintenance.  
 
Goals and requirements to the maintenance processes should be defined in accordance to the 
superior strategies for HSE, regularity and costs. Maintenance programs are developed in 
accordance to regulations (cf. the Activities Regulations section 47 on Maintenance programs 
and section 46 on Classification) with the objective of ensuring safe, efficient and cost 
effective operations. The maintenance activities are planned and executed according the 
specified programs, and after execution reports based on the maintenance results, the achieved 
technical condition, costs, regularity and risk is analyzed. Any identified improvements are 
implemented into the process (cf. the Activities Regulations Section 49; Maintenance 
effectiveness), and then the loop is closed. All the elements must be present and the 
management loop must be closed for ensuring the most effective maintenance function. It is 
important that the entire process is supervised and documented to ensure sufficient quality and 
continuous improvement of the work processes.  
 
Following section will present an overview and short description of the different maintenance 
policies and practices for maintaining industrial plants and offshore installations today. 
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2.3 Maintenance Strategies Overview 
Offshore O&G installations are complex facilities where resources are limited; specific 
maintenance personnel, tools or spare parts are not always readily available. The installations 
are often geographically remote, which means that a critical unforeseen or unplanned failure 
event can cause considerable production downtime. The events that bring production 
reduction or shutdown can turn very expensive in a short amount of time. With the mindset of 
operating in accordance to regulations, standards and internal company policies, while at the 
same time maximizing production; the assets must be maintained to the specified level of 
performance for ensuring the highest level of HSE. To achieve this, different maintenance 
strategies are applied for different types of systems, equipments and components based on 
their criticality, reliability, and cost efficiency. Figure 2.5 presents an overview of different 
maintenance policies and categories, and will be further explained below. 
 
Figure 2.5, Classification of Maintenance Policies (adapted from Nystad, 2008) 
 
Generally, there are two main types of policies; planned and unforeseen maintenance 
(Nystad, 2008):  
1) Unforeseen Maintenance will always be corrective maintenance, since the failures occur 
unexpectedly. The maintenance action is performed after the part/system has failed. The 
purpose is putting the part/system back to function as soon as possible, either by repairing 
or replacing the failed item.  
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2) Planned Maintenance can be further classified as corrective maintenance or preventive 
maintenance. 
a) Planned corrective maintenance is when parts/systems are deliberately run-to-failure. 
This strategy is applied for non critical components where failures represent no threat 
to HSE, availability or economy. It does however assume continuous follow-up of 
costs and availability for assuring necessary changes and adjustments.  
 
b) Planned preventive maintenance is the maintenance activities performed while the 
parts/systems are in operation. This includes all actions for retaining the part/system to 
a specified condition, by performing systematic inspection, detection and prevention of 
incipient failures.  
 
Planned preventive maintenance can be further classified into two categories: 
 
i) Periodical maintenance interventions consist of inspecting and 
overhauling/replacing parts or systems at time scheduled intervals. The 
interventions can either be scheduled at specific pre-defined calendar times or 
based on concepts like operational hours, number of system activations, etc.    
 
ii) Technical condition monitoring is a way of gaining continuous knowledge about 
the technical condition of equipments and systems, providing possibilities for 
monitoring degradation and discovering incipient failures at an early stage. This 
will give the maintenance personnel time to plan, decide and perform maintenance 
interventions before failures and breakdown occur. Avoiding unforeseen 
breakdowns can minimize the extent of damage on equipment, reduce repair costs 
and reduce the total system downtime. It is important to note that condition 
monitoring is a preventive process with the purpose of justifying the maintenance 
actions to be performed; a kind of “if not broken, don‟t fix it” policy.  
 
The best overall maintenance strategies will normally be a combination of the categories 
mentioned above, exploiting the strengths and weaknesses of each category by using them 
where best appropriate. Some maintenance categories are substantially more expensive than 
others and will therefore not be cost effective for all types of equipment.   
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2.3.1 Maintenance regulations, standards and best practices 
All O&G installations on the NCS must be operated and maintained in compliance with the 
rules and regulations issued by the Norwegian government and the PSA. To assure the highest 
level of safety, while providing a high working environment standard with the lowest possible 
emissions to the environment; the following hierarchy of governing regulations, requirements 
and standards apply (Figure 2.6). 
 
 
Figure 2.6, Hierarchy of steering documents (Erstad, 2011) 
 
The following sections of this chapter will map today‟s requirements and best practices for 
maintenance and inspection analyses leading to the formation of maintenance and inspection 
programs for O&G process equipment. The study is based on the following authority 
regulations and requirements, industry standards, recommended practices and AS internal best 
practice procedures; 
  
1) Authority Regulations 
PSA is the governmental supervisory authority of the Norwegian petroleum industry. Its 
responsibility regards the technical and operational safety, emergency preparedness and 
working environment in the Norwegian O&G industry (Ptil.no). According to AS Document 
1 (2010), the following PSA regulations are applicable for doing maintenance and inspection 
analyses:  
 
 The Activities Regulations, Chapter IX: Maintenance (section 42 – 47)  
 The Management Regulations, Chapter VI: Follow-up and Improvement 
 The Facilities Regulations: Regulations related to design and outfitting 
 
2) Industry Standards 
 Norsok Z-008: Criticality Analysis for Maintenance Purposes 
This standard serves as a guideline for establishing a basis for preparation and optimization of 
maintenance programs, based on the criticality of systems and equipment. The intention is to 
provide requirements and guidelines to a foundation for preparing and optimizing 
maintenance programs for static and rotating equipment. It is applicable for equipment placed 
on offshore or onshore, topside or subsea, new or in-service facilities. 
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3) Recommended Practices 
 DNV RP-G101: Risk Based Inspection of Offshore Topsides Static Mech. Equipment 
This recommended practice describes a method for establishing and maintaining a RBI plan 
for offshore static mechanical process equipment. It provides guidelines and 
recommendations used for customizing methods and working procedures that support the 
inspection planning process. 
 
4) AS Internal Procedures 
 AS Document 1 (2008): P132 – Maintenance Analyses 
Document for ensuring that maintenance analyses performed in connection with 
modifications/new buildings are prepared in a systematic way, at a qualitative acceptable 
standard, and in accordance with authority requirements, customer requirements and AS best 
practices. 
 
 AS Document 2 (2006): A132-K01 - Method description for Maintenance Analyses 
This document describes AS methodology and work processes for performing maintenance 
analyses and maintenance program establishment. The methodology is based on general 
requirements from authorities, typical customer requirements, acknowledged standards and 
company best practices.  
 
 AS Document 3 (2006): A132-K02 - Method description for Inspection Analyses 
Provides a brief description of working processes, methods and criteria for analysis of static 
equipment to identify risk and prepare inspection programs for monitoring  the condition of 
plant during operation. 
 
2.4 Maintenance Engineering Process 
High level, cost efficient TI can be achieved by assigning the correct maintenance strategies 
to the different systems and components of an O&G facility. Thus it is important to evaluate 
the criticality of components before deciding on their respective maintenance strategies. The 
maintenance activities are planned, prioritized and executed based on equipment criticality 
with respect to HSE and production acceptance criteria. Figure 2.7 shows the main elements 
involved for today‟s practice of maintenance engineering, and the following sections will 
describe the main activities in this process.  
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Figure 2.7, Maintenance Engineering Process, AS Document 4 (2003) 
2.5 Data Collection  
First step of the process is gathering technical data and information on all relevant 
components and systems for creating a sufficient basis to the criticality and maintenance 
analyses. Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) analyses, Safety Integrity Level 
(SIL) analyses and design phase risk analyses are important inputs in this process. Also, data 
is collected from company internal or common industry engineering databases. Vendors will 
also provide valuable technical and operational information regarding the systems and 
equipment they deliver. 
2.6 Criticality Classification 
Performing criticality classification will give an assessment of the consequence for loss of 
function with regards to safety, environmental and financial aspects of all tagged functions 
and equipment. The analysis provides valuable information that forms an important 
foundation for establishing maintenance and inspection programs. According to the PSA‟s 
Activities Regulations, Section 46:  
 
“Facilities' systems and equipment shall be classified as regards the health, safety and 
environment consequences of potential functional failures. 
For functional failures that can lead to serious consequences, the responsible party shall 
identify the various fault modes with associated failure causes and failure mechanisms, and 
predict the probability of failure for the individual fault mode.  
The classification shall be used as a basis in choosing maintenance activities and 
maintenance frequencies, in prioritizing between different maintenance activities and in 
evaluating the need for spare parts.”  
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Consequently there are legal requirements for the responsible parties to perform system 
criticality classification and equipment ranking with regards to consequences of function 
failure, and analyzing severe failure modes and mechanisms with predicted probability of 
failure (PoF). To perform the classification in accordance with regulations, the PSA advise the 
Norsok Z-008 standard to be used.  
2.6.1 The Classification Process 
Criticality analyses consist of performing a system breakdown into main- and sub-functions, 
and then ranking the equipment with respect to the consequences of function failure. This 
calls for good knowledge and experience regarding equipment, systems and their operational 
functions. To assure a high quality analysis, it is vital that a group of multidiscipline 
representatives participate in the consequence assessments and functional breakdown. The 
methodology will be further addressed in the following subchapters, with the basis of the 
Norsok Z-008 and AS internal procedures. 
2.6.1.1 Establish decision criteria 
Classification of the consequence of failures must be defined before initiating criticality 
analyses. This should be done in compliance with the company‟s HSE policies, and the 
financial losses shall be defined in accordance with the specific facility subject for analysis. 
 
Consequence Classification 
AS Document 2 (2006) recommend using a matrix like Table 1 for classifying the most 
serious effects for loss of functionality. Consequence is divided into five degrees of criticality. 
Values for regularity (lost production) and cost limits must be specified according to the 
production rates and repair costs of the particular facility or system. If a failure causes “loss of 
containment” there is need for separate evaluations regarding the consequences for HSE, as 
leakage to the environment will have varying effects depending on the chemical composition 
of the medium, the volume and location of the leakage (open sea, shore, earth or atmosphere). 
The consequence classification related to containment is intended as a prioritization of static 
mechanical equipment for establishing an inspection program, and will be further presented in 
Chapter 2.8. In addition to oil, three different chemical groupings have been included to give 
more precise estimations of the seriousness of leakage, according to the toxicity and reactivity 
of the chemicals.   
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Medical Serious Permanent 
treatment personal injury injury
Oil < 200 l 0.2 – 2 m3 2 – 20 m3 20 – 200 m3 > 200 m3
Chem. Deg. 1 < 25 l 25 – 200 l 0.2 – 1 m3 1 – 10 m3 > 10 m3
Chem. Deg. 2 < 200 l 0.2 – 1 m3 1 – 10 m3 10 – 100 m3 > 100 m3
Chem. Deg. 3 < 1 m3 1 – 10 m3 10 – 100 m3 100 – 1000 m3 > 1000 m3
< 250k 250k – 1 mill 1 – 10 mill. 10 – 50 mill.  > 50 mill. 
< 50k 50k – 250k 250k – 1 mill 1 – 10 mill. > 10 mill. Costs:
Consequence:
Safety: 
1 2
First aid Death
Category /
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t
Regularity:
3 4 5
 
Table 1, Consequence Criteria, AS Document 2 (2006). 
 
Frequency Classes 
Classifying the estimated function failure frequency (Mean Time to Failure). The frequency 
classification is not included in the Norsok Z-008, but is part of AS‟ procedure for criticality 
classification (AS Document 2, 2006). The frequency values are usually based on 
company/vendor/customers historical and reliability data.  
 
Frequency (f) MTBF 
(expected failures  per year) (Mean Time Between Failure)
a f < 0.03 MTBF > 30 years
b 0.03 < f < 0.2 30 years > MTBF > 5 years
c 0.2 < f < 1 5 years > MTBF > 1 year
d 1 < f < 2 1 years > MTBF > 6 months
e f > 2 MTBF < 6 months
Frequency class
  
Table 2, Frequency Classes, AS Document 2 (2006). 
 
Criticality classes 
Criticality is the combination of stated likelihood and the consequence of potential function 
failure. Criticality classifications are performed with the use of five grades, shown in Table 3. 
Criticality will indicate risk-ranking for equipment and give basic indication for which 
maintenance priorities or strategies to be used for establishing maintenance programs.  
 
Maintenance Strategy
VH Very High Equipment/system should not be operated under specific conditions
H High PM/Condition Monitoring
M Medium PM if appropriate/cost-efficiency requirements
L Low Corrective Maintenance or 1st line mainenance
VL Very Low Corrective Maintenance 
Criticality
 
Table 3, Criticality Classification, AS Document 2 (2006). 
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2.6.1.2 Defining Main and Sub-functions  
O&G facilities consist of numerous components and systems to perform the different tasks 
required for production and processing. Prior to criticality analysis, the plant should be 
divided into systems covering the whole facility‟s functions (e.g. gas export, gas conditioning, 
gas compression etc). The boundaries between these systems must be clearly defined, and 
each of the systems shall be given a unique id with the use of engineering numbering system 
(ENS). Systems relevant for further criticality analysis must be identified. Selection of 
equipment should be based on maintenance cost, main contributors to production 
loss/unavailability and safety related incidents.  
 
Main function (MF) definition 
MFs are the principal tasks performed on the facility (e.g. pumping, compression, separation 
etc). All MFs must be identified, assigned unique numbered descriptions and named 
according to the task/process performed. The name should aim to describe the active function 
(i.e. compression instead of compressor). The MF boundaries should be clearly defined and 
documented in P&IDs, flow diagrams and other relevant documentation.   
 
MF consequence assessment 
To get sufficient assessments for the consequences of severe MF faults, there is a need for 
personnel with experience from risk and reliability evaluations in cooperation with 
experienced operations and maintenance personnel. The total MF is assessed in terms of the 
most critical effects of a fault, with the level of redundancy disregarded. Redundancy will be 
treated independently. The most critical, but still realistic, effects from a fault shall be 
identified, and the impact they have on the total performance of the MF shall be quantified in 
accordance with Table 1. For some cases, it will be important to also describe compensating 
operational actions in the consequence assessment, and estimate the time from failure 
occurring till it actually affects the system. If a failure is likely to affect more than one of the 
categories (HSE, production and cost), this shall be assessed and the probable course of 
events described.   
 
Sub function (SF) definition 
The MFs shall then be further divided into sub functions. As for MFs, the SFs shall describe 
the active function performed. SFs for typical process equipment can be standardized to cover 
all requirements. Some SFs (e.g. lubricating or containment) will often be repetitive in a 
system. The most important thing is that all equipment in each instrument loop is connected to 
one SF. In cases where a SF performs several tasks, the equipment shall be connected to the 
most critical SF. 
 
SF consequence assessment 
The same principles apply for consequence assessment of SFs as already outlined for MFs. 
The impacts of failure on SFs are assessed with respects to HSE, production and costs 
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(excluding production loss). If a failure on the SF can occur without affecting the MF under 
normal operating conditions, this shall be identified and labeled a hidden failure. For the SFs 
that are safety critical, the failure modes and rates must be identified and expressed in detail in 
order to select the optimal maintenance activities when assessing the consequences of 
function failure (Norsok Z-008).  
 
Redundancy of MFs and SFs 
All MFs and SFs shall be defined by the number of units, the unit capacity (%) and the level 
of redundancy. If there is redundancy within a SF, the number of parallel units and capacity 
per unit shall be stipulated. The redundancy shall be classified using the codes in Table 4.   
 
Redundancy Redundancy Degree Definition
A No unit can suffer a fault without influencing the function
B One unit can suffer a fault without influencing the function.
C Two or more parallel units can fail at the same time without influencing the function   
Table 4, Redundancy Classification, adapted from NORSOK Z-008 (2001) 
 
Functional hierarchy 
The facility has been broken down to a functional hierarchy consisting of plant systems, main-
functions and sub-functions. Figure 2.8 illustrates the breakdown of a gas export system, with 
the defined MFs covering the principal tasks of the system, and the standardized sub functions 
covering the MF.  
 
 
Figure 2.8, Example of Functional Hierarchy, adapted from Norsok Z-008 Appendix C (2001) 
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2.6.2 Equipment Criticality Classification 
To summarize; the whole facility has been divided into MFs and respective SFs, and all 
tagged equipment has been assigned to one SF. The decision criteria are defined; 
consequently the foundation for equipment criticality classification is set. Table 2 for failure 
frequency and Table 1 for consequence are combined into one decision-making matrix for 
criticality (Table 5). This matrix shows criticality levels in accordance with the pre-defined 
criticality classes (Table 3) for the various combinations of frequency and consequence. All 
tags within one SF must be given the same description, consequence classification and 
redundancy as the SF they are part of, because failure on any of this equipment will cause the 
same consequence on the MF.  
 
 
Table 5, Example of Criticality Matrix, AS Document 2 (2006). 
 
Documenting the Criticality Analysis 
It is of great importance that the criticality assessment is properly documented and made 
easily available for revisions, updates and improvements. Over time, experiences and 
feedback from operation can give need for updates, and this is much easier if the classification 
is traceable. As a minimum, the following should be documented (Norsok Z-008):  
 
 Decision criteria 
 Definition of consequence classes. 
 MF and SF description and redundancy assessment. 
 Assignment of equipment (tags) to sub function. 
 Assessment of the consequences of loss of MFs and sub functions for all consequence 
categories, including necessary arguments for assignment of consequence classes. 
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2.7 Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) 
The criticality classification of all tagged equipment will provide clear insight to the systems 
weakest, most critical parts, and this is an important input for assigning maintenance and 
inspection strategies to components and equipments. “Very Low” and “Low” criticality 
components can be allocated maintenance programs without further studies; such components 
will normally be assigned to corrective maintenance or 1
st
 line
1
 maintenance strategies. 
Components considered as “Medium” or “Highly” critical are potentially relevant for further 
reliability centered maintenance (RCM) analyses, and will undergo a screening for identifying 
the relevant objects. But performing complete full-depth RCM analyses is a complex, time 
and resource consuming process; hence the screening will only identify a small number of 
relevant objects. Previously analyzed components (e.g. by vendors) will therefore not be 
subject for new analyses. All components found irrelevant for further analyses shall be 
assigned to a maintenance program in accordance with current best practice, vendor 
recommendations and authority requirements for similar type components, as shown in Figure 
2.9. This will usually be a preventive maintenance strategy, or in some cases where cost 
beneficial; condition monitoring strategies. Components classified with “Very High” 
criticality represents such risks that they should not be operated under these conditions, and 
must therefore be modified with the aim of lowering the risk.  
 
 
Figure 2.9, RCM process, adapted from AS Document 2 (2006). 
                                                 
1
 Maintenance activities performed without using work orders, external assistance or interrupting production. 
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RCM-analyses are best appropriate for systems/equipment with high economic and/or safety 
criticalities, or where major financial and/or safety gains are possible through further 
optimization of maintenance activities. Moubray (1997) defines RCM as a “process used to 
determine the maintenance requirements of any physical asset in its operating context”, and 
the method is well established for creating or optimizing preventive maintenance programs 
for offshore topside process equipment. RCM bases on systematic analyses of 
system/equipment functionality and potential failures, with the purpose of determining 
effective preventive maintenance tasks for controlling or reducing the failure frequency for 
critical failure modes. The screening for RCM objects is based on the following criteria (AS 
Document 2, 2006): 
 
 Equipment not previously analyzed 
 Limited/no experience of equipment/system 
 Criticality 
 High technical/functional complexity of equipment 
 High maintenance costs 
 
The identified RCM objects must undergo FMECA analysis and decision logic for identifying 
relevant failure modes, causes and optimal maintenance actions.  
2.7.1 Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)  
Aven, Røed and Wiencke (2007) define the Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) as “an analysis method used to reveal potential errors and predict the effect of 
failures in components in a system”. Together, the FMECA analyses and the decision logic 
for allocating PM actions are the most vital parts of the RCM process. It involves a systematic 
mapping of failure modes with related failure mechanisms, and identifying effective 
maintenance actions to prevent or control these. To ensure the highest quality analysis, there 
is a need for personnel with solid operational knowledge and experience. As a tool for 
simplifying the process of FMECA, maintenance analyses and allocation of maintenance 
type; sets of standardized failure mode definitions, equipment classes and decision logic can 
be selected.  
 
Failure Modes 
Moubray (1997) defines a failure mode as „any event which causes a functional failure‟. ISO 
14224 (2006) categorizes failure modes into three different types: 
 
 Desired function not achieved (e.g. failure to start) 
 Specified function lost or outside accepted operational limits (e.g. high output) 
 Failure indication is observed but there is no immediate and critical impact on the 
equipment-unit function. (e.g. initial wear)  
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Márquez (2007) states that only failure modes with a high occurrence possibility are to be 
recorded in an FMECA, meaning it is not recommended listing every single failure 
possibility. To simplify the process, a set of standard failure modes based can be defined. The 
failure mode‟s criticality is based on their local effect on equipment function, and divided into 
three levels: 
 
 Critical (C) 
 Degraded (D) 
 Incipient (I) 
 
The frequency of the failure modes is based on operational experience and any available 
reliability data, with the same classification as for criticality analysis (Table 2). 
 
Equipment groups 
The ISO 14224 (2006) provides a methodology for grouping topside process equipment into 
equipment classes and types. As a method for simplifying the maintenance analysis, AS 
Document 2 (2006) advises to use a set of standard equipment groups, partly based on ISO 
14224. This means that all of the tag registered equipment will be connected to one of these 
standard groups, based on its equipment class and type.  
 
2.7.2 Decision Logic 
Based on the above-mentioned standardized failure modes and equipment groups, each 
equipment group will be connected to a set of failure modes. The purpose is to create a 
generic FMECA-analysis that can be used as basis for specific tag level FMECA-analyses for 
the chosen RCM objects. The generic model includes the estimation of failure criticality and 
frequency for each of the modes within the equipment groups.  
 
In addition to the generic FMECA-analysis, a decision logic is used (Figure 2.10) for 
allocating the best suitable maintenance types for the different failure modes. Ability for 
failure detection and failure characteristics are used as decision-making criteria, and to 
identify the relevant maintenance type.   
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Figure 2.10, Decision Logic, AS Document 2 (2006). 
 
RCM meetings 
The RCM objects identified in the screening will undergo specific tag level FMECA-analyses 
with coherent decision logic for allocating maintenance strategies and activities. The generic 
analysis will then form the starting point for further evaluations. This part of the analysis is 
performed in a multidiscipline forum, called an RCM meeting, where experienced operations 
personnel are vital participants. The meeting procedure requires a consistent and goal-oriented 
work process to successfully identify and verify all relevant failure modes and assess 
maintenance actions for component failures on “maintainable item” level. The RCM meetings 
must be planned and structured systematically to ensure best quality results. Meetings need 
firm control and thorough preparation and planning in order to involve the right personnel at 
the right time. All relevant documentation must be available and all preliminary analyses 
completed. The target outcome of the RCM meetings is to achieve best possible consensus for 
decisions and the results suited for direct implementation in a PM program without further 
discussion.    
2.8 Risk Based Inspection (RBI) 
Inspection analyses focus on the damage caused by degrading mechanisms (corrosion, 
erosion, fracture and fatigue) that can be detected by inspection, either from visual 
examination or non-destructive-testing (NDT) methods. These degrading mechanisms can 
cause failure modes (e.g. leakages or ruptures) that may bring unacceptable consequences to 
personnel, environment, production loss or repair costs. RBI seeks to categorize analysis 
objects with regards to criticality. In practice, most risk based inspection analyses are a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, and RBI is therefore usually recognized 
as a semi-quantitative method (DnV RP-G101). Before starting the risk evaluations, the 
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decision criteria and detail level are established and agreed upon. The risk assessment should 
be evaluated regularly, and revised if necessary for including significant changes of input 
information, such as process and operational data, new design conditions and changes in the 
field economy. Figure 2.11 illustrates the main activities of an RBI analysis, and the basics of 
the process will be explained in the following section, in accordance with DnV RP-G101 and 
AS internal procedures.   
 
Figure 2.11, RBI Analysis process, AS Document 3 (2006). 
2.8.1 Risk Screening 
Risk screening is a coarse risk evaluation of component groups with the aim of identifying the 
objects to be included in further detailed risk analyses. From this, further data collection and 
assessment efforts can be limited to these objects. The risk screening matrix (Table 6) shows 
that objects with potentially high risks of leakage are to be included in further detailed risk 
analyses. Characteristic for these objects is that they have a high probability for “loss of 
containment”, and will in such cases bring severe consequences to HSE and financial costs. 
Corrosion and/or erosion prone pipes and vessels containing high pressure and high 
temperature (HPHT) hydrocarbons can be typical examples. Objects that bring severe 
consequences for loss of containment but have low probability of leakage will represent 
significant (yellow) risk levels. For such objects, NDT methods, testing and other condition 
monitoring activities should be taken to measure the extent of degradation so that actions can 
be taken before the risk elevates into the high-risk region. Objects with low consequences will 
be assigned to (planned/unplanned) corrective strategies based on cost-benefit assessments. 
Generally some minor measures (visual inspections, cleaning, etc) must be performed to 
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confirm the condition of the equipment and ensure that the risk level will remain within the 
acceptable green region. 
 
LOW RISK HIGH RISK
Corrective Strategy Detailed RBI
LOW RISK MEDIUM RISK
Corrective Strategy Monitoring
Low High
Consequence
Low
High
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 
Table 6, RBI screening matrix, AS document 3 (2006). 
2.8.2 Detailed Risk Analysis 
The objects classified as medium and high risk components in the screening process are the 
elements that need further detailed considerations, meaning they must be broken down to 
lower level (tag level) and assessed with qualitative, quantitative or semi-quantitative 
methods. The detailed risk analysis aims to identify the relevant degradation mechanisms, the 
probability of failure from these degradations and the expected damage extent in case of 
failure.  
 
Evaluation of Probability of Failure (PoF) 
PoF is the likelihood of an event occurring per unit time. For evaluating the probability of 
failure, the particular object‟s resistance to degradation under operational conditions (media 
composition, pressure, temperature, and material properties) must be considered. Failure 
evaluation firstly involves assessing the possibility of degradation mechanisms to occur, and 
secondly assessing the probability of it.  Differentiation is made between the material 
properties of carbon and stainless steels, and the relevant degradation mechanisms to be 
considered are (AS Document 3, 2006): 
 
 Internal corrosion/erosion  
 External corrosion 
 Fatigue 
 
Evaluation of Consequence of Failure (CoF) 
Consequence of failure is defined regarding to three aspects; Personnel Safety, Environment 
and Economic. 
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 Personnel Safety  
 Should be expressed in terms of potential consequence for physical injuries to 
personnel, ranging from; no need for medical treatment to death or very serious 
injuries. 
 
 Environment  
 Consequences should be expressed in terms of the toxicity and mass/volume of the 
medium released to environment. Table 5 presents three different chemical groupings 
in addition to oil, for estimating the seriousness of leakage.   
 Economic consequence should be expressed in financial terms using appropriate 
currency units. 
 
It is recommended that the ranking of CoF is separately assessed and presented individually, 
depending on the consequence type (Personnel, Environment, and Economy) (DnV RP-G101, 
2009, AS Document 3).  This will bring proper focus for each aspect to be addressed.  
 
Risk categorization 
The risk category allocated to a component, is a function of the probability and consequence 
categories previously allocated by the RBI analysis, and presented as a matrix showing the 
relative contribution of CoF and PoF. For a simplified and consistent decision process, the 
risk matrix should be standardized throughout the operator/field. DnV RP-G101 recommends 
a detail resolution of 5 × 5 matrix for adequate resolution of detail.   
 
1 2 3 4 5
5 L M H VH VH
4 L M H H VH
3 VL L M H H
2 VL VL L M M
1 VL VL VL L L
Risk category
Consequence
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 
Table 7, Risk Categorization, AS Document 3 (2006) 
 
2.9 Establish PM Program & Implementation 
After collecting all relevant data and having performed the criticality and reliability analyses 
the preventive maintenance programs can be developed (Figure 2.7). The maintenance, 
inspection and test activities seek to detect, prevent and minimize potential failures with 
regards to the analyzed risk of equipment failure, and are designed to reflect the overall 
strategy of ensuring to keep the facility within the desired technical condition through 
performing safe, efficient and economic maintenance. The PM programs define the specific 
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maintenance tasks, the equipment to be used, the frequency maintenance should be performed 
at, generic work descriptions, discipline man hours, need for spare parts and so on. Inspection 
programs are established on the basis of the results from the RBI analysis. An RBI program 
will specify the most probable degrading mechanisms, their location and scope, which 
inspection methods to be used for detection, the inspection intervals per corrosion group and 
requirements to reporting the results.  
 
Having defined the PM programs; last step is implementation into the CMMS system, usually 
SAP. The implementation consists of specifying the maintenance actions with regards to the 
respective components; define work orders containing job tasks, the sequence of performance, 
the expected time estimation etc. Further the execution should be specified to clearly indicate 
how the work should be performed in accordance to requirements and best procedures 
regarding HSE and maintenance quality. Results from completed maintenance actions should 
be reported to provide inputs for optimizing the maintenance programs and analyze their 
efficiency. Collected experiences should be analyzed to identify measures for continuously 
improving the maintenance programs and also used for updating the criticality assessments. 
                                                                                                                          
The increasing use of ICT on the NCS has made it possible to transfer vast amounts of real 
time data through high speed fiber cables between off- and onshore installations. This has led 
to increasing use of condition monitoring technology giving operators the possibility to detect 
degradations at an early stage. This has brought significant opportunities for performing 
maintenance on a condition based basis; streamlining the maintenance activities by 
performing “right time” maintenance. Next chapter will present the maintenance 
developments and possibilities emerging from the presence of ICT and data integration 
technologies.  
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3 MAINTENANCE IMPACTS FROM ICT & 
 DATA INTEGRATION  
With the growing demand for high levels of HSE, and the before mentioned need for reducing 
OPEX‟es and production downtime on the maturing fields of the NCS; the importance of 
efficient maintenance strategies becomes unquestionable. But many challenges are still to be 
solved if the objective is to perform maintenance in a way where action is only taken when 
required, following a condition based maintenance (CBM) approach. As the price of 
technology for gathering, processing and acting on information is decreasing, the price for 
making incorrect decisions is increasing (Jantunen et al. 2010). Growing use of mobile 
communication and internet technologies brings new possibilities for solving business and 
maintenance problems, bringing rapid benefits for maintenance strategies like CBM and 
predictive maintenance by allowing them to become cost-effective for a wider range of 
equipment types. During the last decade maintenance policies and strategies have undergone 
major developments; moving from the traditional „fail and fix‟ towards „predict and prevent‟ 
strategies (Jantunen et al. 2010), and the term “e-maintenance” has emerged in the field of 
engineering asset management. 
3.1 E-maintenance 
Moving towards an e-maintenance approach means utilizing state-of-the-art ICT for 
integrating and synchronizing various maintenance and reliability applications to deliver 
maintenance related asset information “where it is needed and when it is needed” (Verma, 
Srividya, & Ramesh, 2010). Numerous authors have proposed various definitions of the 
concept; Baldwin (2004) defines e-maintenance as an “asset information management 
network that integrates and synchronizes the various maintenance and reliability applications 
to gather and deliver asset information where it is needed when it is needed”. E-maintenance 
is neither regarded as a maintenance strategy nor a single technology. It is the end result of 
integration between different technologies that together form a highly innovative and efficient 
ICT framework for integrated and efficient maintenance. The main objective is to implement 
ever-present maintenance management. This means that maintenance planning, decision-
making and execution as well as data and tools to process and act upon them are made 
available anytime, anywhere and to anyone with the authorization to access them at multiple 
levels of operation (Jantunen et al. 2010). It allows for instant technical support and 
interoperability
2
 between maintenance specialists with real-time access to remote information 
about systems and environments, independent of location. This brings huge benefits to 
maintenance engineering and decision-making in distributed organizations where plants, 
people, expertise and/or data is physically separate or isolated. The consistent access and 
                                                 
2
 Interoperability is the ability two or more systems/components have to exchange information, and to use the information that has been 
exchanged.  
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exchange of information also allows for closer collaboration and knowledge sharing between 
units, departments, companies, experts and processes.  
 
At operations level, e-maintenance involves technologies and tools for integrating functions 
for monitoring component degradation status and availability condition, provide decision-
making personnel with diagnostics and prognostic information, and support the estimation of 
performance indicators. Higher up the hierarchy, e-maintenance provides enabling tools and 
information for assisting the implementation of selected maintenance policy at strategic level, 
while presenting interfaces to the CMMS and ERP systems. At top level, e-maintenance 
presents the necessary decision-support tools for adopting/defining maintenance policies and 
assigning these to lower hierarchical maintenance layers (Jantunen et al. 2010). Compared to 
conventional maintenance practices, e-maintenance can introduce unique possibilities for 
improved efficiency and transparency into maintenance strategies (Figure 3.1), and also 
provide possibilities for reducing the number of interfaces; either they are IT systems, 
departments or personnel (Crespo-Márquez, 2007).  
 
 
 Figure 3.1, Transparency of strategies (Crespo-Márquez, 2007, s. 309) 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the main pillars that together form the e-maintenance approach. The 
pillars represent the four new maintenance strategies enabled by e-maintenance, and will be 
further presented in the following points (Cannata, Karnouskos, & Taisch, 2009):  
 
 
Figure 3.2, e-Maintenance: Basis and main pillars, (Cannata, Karnouskos, & Taisch, 2009) 
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 Remote maintenance: 
 The presence of new ICT developments brings new possibilities for maintenance 
assistance and consultations, independent of geographical locations. Through remote 
maintenance applications a maintenance decision maker or expert consultant can perform a 
job without ever being present at the asset location. This will have a significant influence 
in terms of response time, downtime costs and the effectiveness of maintenance 
interventions.  
 
 Predictive maintenance (or CBM): 
E-maintenance and its information and communication infrastructure facilitates for 
implementation of predictive maintenance, a recent evolution within maintenance and 
reliability engineering. Through hardware and software components available at floor 
level; data can be collected, analyzed and maintenance actions requested accordingly to 
minimize unexpected failures, optimize maintenance interventions and assure appropriate 
asset operation and availability.  
 
 Real-time maintenance; 
The time delay between the moment when events take place on the shop floor (i.e. a 
machine failure) and the moment when that information is available for the 
operator/responsible is significantly reduced. This will allow for increased reactivity of 
maintenance activities.    
 
 Collaborative maintenance; 
E-maintenance concepts enables collaboration between different areas of the enterprise, 
both internally (intra-enterprise) and between different enterprises (inter-enterprise). In the 
maintenance domain, collaboration issues are i.e. reduction of information interfaces, 
seamless communication, security, and so on. 
 
Figure 3.2 also illustrates that the fundamental element and backbone of e-maintenance 
concept is the implementation of an appropriate information and communication 
infrastructure (I&CI) (Muller, Iung, & Crespo-Marquez, 2007).  
 
3.2 Information and Communication Infrastructure  
The presence of a consistent infrastructure that can support the management and control of 
maintenance activities and present them real-time to higher level business layers is a founding 
issue for moving towards feasible solutions of e-maintenance applications. A typical 
information and communication infrastructure (I&CI) for a maintenance concept are 
considered to consist and integrate several information sectors, Moore and Starr (2006) lists 
some examples:  
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 Condition monitoring systems (internal/external) 
 Control systems and production schedulers  
 Maintenance scheduling systems (CMMS/ EAM) 
 Plant Asset Management (PAM) systems 
 Engineering Product Data Management systems  
 Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems  
 
Cannata, Karnouskos and Taisch (2009) have defined six vital requirements that should be 
present for an I&CI to be applicable in a maintenance context: 
 
Interoperability 
To effectively support the emerging “predict and prevent” maintenance strategies this 
infrastructure should enable open communication between different actors in different layers, 
to the right time, and through the implementation of various tools and technologies globally 
distributed. This can be done by adopting a common language that reduces the requirement 
for interfaces between different systems. The goal is to achieve common basis for flawless 
operation of standard functions such as discovery, description, addressing, invocation, etc.    
 
Scalability and flexibility 
With rapid technology developments and evolution towards more flexible and adaptive 
facilities and maintenance strategies it is important that the I&CI is susceptible to changing 
conditions. This means being compatible with future modifications and changes, such as new 
types/models of assets monitored, more assets monitored and new future monitoring 
techniques. This dynamicity must be supported through a scalable and flexible infrastructure 
for maintenance data and information exchange.  
 
Security  
In such open infrastructures where huge amounts of data, business and collaboration 
processes are exchanged between facilities and companies at several layers, security is a key 
issue. These systems require a different security approach compared to traditional 
architectures, in the sense that they must be flexible enough to tailor themselves to 
application-specific security requirements, but also to be customizable for policy/compliance. 
 
Device to Business (D2B) Integration  
With the increasing development and sophistication of personal digital assistants (PDA) and 
similar portable devices, new capabilities emerge on the floor and enable such devices to 
actively participate in maintenance applications. The devices can provide information from 
internal domains, and/or acquire information from enterprise level, as for example trigger an 
event in the maintenance process and also influence its execution. A consistent I&CI should 
consider these factors and adopt a general approach to represent information among 
heterogeneous systems.  
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Distributed management:  
In order to fully exploit remote and collaborative maintenance, a distributed infrastructure is 
required that does not only consider hierarchical control as this constrains the opportunities 
enabled by heterogeneous, distributed, and autonomous interaction among single elements 
(e.g. operators, devices, watchdog agents, etc.). Moreover, this requirement can inherently add 
flexibility and scalability to the system by reducing the number of centralized points. 
 
Semantics: 
The I&CI should inherently support knowledge processing, due to the importance of ontology 
in the e-maintenance context. In connection to knowledge and information sharing, the term 
ontology is meant as a specification of a conceptualization. Thus ontology is a description of 
the concepts and relationships that can exist for an agent or a community of agents (Gilabert 
& Voisin, 2010). Knowledge processing is vital when implementing effective collaboration 
between multiple actors, and this requirement allows for collaboration through formal 
description of elements and relationships in the maintenance domain.  
 
These abovementioned points are regarded to be vital qualities for an information and data 
exchange infrastructure to be sufficiently applicable in the O&G industry‟s operations and 
maintenance context. With the emerging need for common cross-industry communication 
protocols several initiatives have been formed with the aim of standardizing the rules of 
communication so that CM systems and new technology devices from different vendors can 
be connected and added to factory networks without needing extensive configurations in order 
to be compatible (Starr & Ball, 2005). Next section will present some of the standards and 
initiatives taken to accomplish this. 
3.2.1 Data Integration Standards and Initiatives 
Integration and interoperability between separated islands of maintenance and reliability 
information are becoming increasingly important in modern maintenance regimes. Therefore, 
the information and communication infrastructure network must provide seamless exchange 
of asset-related information from and between multiple sources (Muller, Iung, & Crespo-
Marquez, 2007). The development of international standards is an important initiative for 
making this process as smooth as possible. This section will further introduce some 
recognized standards regarding smart transducer interfaces for sensors and actuators (IEEE 
1451), artificial intelligence techniques in test equipment (IEEE 1232), standardized CBM 
system architecture (OSA-CBM) and standardized communication among CBM modules 
(MIMOSA). Adopting these standard information exchange protocols will bring fewer 
problems with IT and data-acquisition issues when trying to get the systems compatible, and 
instead allow more focus towards developing and optimizing the new maintenance 
possibilities that the integration of this technology brings. Implementing standardized 
communication and interoperability protocols would also provide the users with more 
technological choices, bring faster technology developments and ultimately reduce the prices 
of CBM technologies (Bengtsson, 2004).   
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IEEE 1451: Smart Transducer Interface Standard 
The founding level of the CBM systems consists of sensor devices that “collect” the data 
needed for analyzing the health assessment of systems and machineries. Because of emerging 
network problems with integrating different vendor products (transducers, sensors and 
actuators), standards for both hardware interconnection and software module network 
interoperability is needed. In the mid 90‟s, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) started developing a 
standardized interface to network smart sensors. By linking sensors together in the same way 
personal computers are linked to a local area network (LAN), one achieved easy installation 
and upgrading of sensors. With this, several sensors can be connected via one single cable (or 
bus), meaning that sensors can be detached without further affecting other sensors 
(Bengtsson, 2004).  
 
IEEE 1232: Artificial Intelligence ESTATE Standard 
The standard for Artificial Intelligence Exchange and Service Tie to All Test Environments 
(AI-ESTATE) provides a set of specifications for data interchange and standard services for 
the test and diagnostic environment. “It has the purpose of standardizing interfaces among 
functional elements of intelligent diagnostic reasoners and representations of diagnostic 
knowledge and data for use by such diagnostic reasoners. Formal information models are 
defined to form the basis for a format to facilitate exchange of persistent diagnostic 
information between two reasoners, and also to provide a formal typing system for diagnostic 
services. This standard then defines the services to manipulate diagnostic information and to 
control a diagnostic reasoner” (Techstreet, 2011). 
 
ISO 13373-1: Condition monitoring and diagnostics of machines 
The ISO 13373-1 provides general guidelines for measuring and data collection functions for 
machine condition monitoring, focusing on machine vibrations. The standard was developed 
to ensure consistency in measurement procedures and practices and contains 
recommendations on measurement methods/parameters and transducer selection, location and 
attachment (Bengtsson, 2004). 
 
MIMOSA  
MIMOSA
TM 
is an alliance of operations and maintenance (O&M) solution providers and end-
user companies who are focused on developing consensus-driven open data standards to 
enable open standards-based O&M interoperability (MIMOSA, 2008). The association has 
the objective of standardizing a networking protocol within the community of CBM 
developers and users that will drive CBM suppliers to produce interchangeable hardware and 
software components. The development of MIMOSA CRIS (Common Relational Information 
Schema) (openly published on the Mimosa website) provides coverage for the information 
(data) managed within a CBM system (Bengtsson, 2004). OSA-CBM is developed around 
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CRIS, which provides coverage of the data that will be managed within a condition based 
maintenance system (Gilabert & Voisin, 2010).  
 
Open System Architecture for Condition Based Maintenance (OSA-CBM) 
OSA-CBM has been designed as an open non-proprietary communications framework for 
CBM systems, covering the entire range of functions for the hardware and software 
components of such systems. It has the purpose of providing a functional, flexible platform 
compatible with a wide range of applications. The integration difficulties among different 
vendor products bring limited flexibility of CBM systems. Also, the current range of 
proprietary industry standards available can lock users into one single source solution 
(Bengtsson, 2004).  Therefore, by introducing non-proprietary open system architecture 
standards the OSA-CBM development enables better cross-industry interoperability of CBM 
components. According to the organization itself, the OSA-CBM is believed to bring 
following benefits (MIMOSA, 2010):  
 
 Cost - significant cost savings since system integrators and vendors will not spend time 
creating their own architectures.  
 
 Specialization - when not constraining vendors to provide entire CBM systems, it allows 
them to concentrate on one or few areas. This increased specialization can bring better 
technology developments.  
 
 Competition - all vendors are allowed to access the same input and output interfaces. 
Separating functionality from how information is presented to other applications will allow 
first hand comparison of the developed functionalities. This means that competition now 
will occur at a functional level and not at system or total solution level. 
 
 Cooperation – with CBM sectioned into separate independent blocks, multiple vendors will 
be allowed to work on separate modules. As the standard also defines the interfaces, all of 
the modules can communicate seamlessly if developed from the same technologies. 
 
The OSA-CBM framework consists of seven functional layers interacting together and 
forming a complete integrated system (Figure 3.3). The architecture includes the typical 
stages in development, deployment, and integration of condition based maintenance solutions, 
from data acquisition to decision support and presentation interface. 
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Figure 3.3, OSA-CBM architecture, (Muller, Iung, & Crespo-Marquez, 2007) 
 
Each of the different layers are capable of requesting data from all the other functional layers 
if needed, however data flow will usually occur between adjacent functional layers. The 
general functions of the layers will be further specified below (Bengtsson, 2004): 
 
Layer 1: Data Acquisition/Sensor Module:  
Provides the CBM system with digitized sensor or transducer data placed on the respective 
equipment, e.g. vibration probe sensors placed on a bearing.  
 
Layer 2 Data Manipulation/Signal Processing:  
Receives the data from the sensor module, process these data and deliver the data on request 
from the condition monitoring module. 
 
Layer 3: Condition Monitor:  
This layer receives measurements data from the sensor and signal processing modules. The 
main focus is to compare data against preset expected values, and generate alerts in case of 
anomaly detection or changes in the usual trend.  
 
Layer 4: Diagnosis/Health Assessment:  
This layer receives inputs from the different condition monitors and health assessment 
modules of the CBM system. The primary function is to determine if the health of the 
monitored asset has degraded, based on anomaly detections on components or sub-systems. 
The health assessment module should be able to generate health records proposing possible 
faults, based on health history, operational status and maintenance tasks history.  
 
Layer 5 Prognostics:  
The prognostic module should be able to receive its data input from all prior layers. Its prime 
focus is calculating the future asset health condition, by also taking account of future usage 
profiles. The module should then report the failure health status of the asset, in form of a 
specified time or the remaining useful life (RUL). 
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Layer 6: Decision Support  
Decision support receives input data from the health assessment and prognostic modules, and 
also from CMMS, ERP systems etc. The prime focus is to propose recommended actions and 
alternatives, such as maintenance intervention methods or recommendations of how to operate 
the asset until current mission is completed without breakdown.  
 
Layer 7: Presentation 
The presentation layer has the ability to access and present data from all of the previous 
layers. The condition monitoring, health assessment, prognostic and decision support layers 
would normally represent the most important sources to present. With this, one has the ability 
to access a wide range of information, from various sources in a single interface. The 
presentation layer will not be a standardized layer, the design and structure will vary 
according to the application.  
 
3.3 Summary  
The recognition of IO and implementation of modern ICT on the NCS have opened 
possibilities for increasing levels of CBM within the O&G industry. With the industry 
gradually moving towards increased use of remote real-time condition monitoring of its assets 
this chapter has reviewed some of the industry standards and initiatives for standardizing the 
information and data exchange between CM modules and systems. As mentioned in the 
introduction of this thesis Aker Solutions have formed an industry alliance SKF and IBM with 
the aim of delivering Technical Integrity Management Services (TIMS). According to Kumar, 
Panesar and Markeset (2009) the purpose of TIMS is to “reduce adverse affects caused by 
performance killers and cost drivers through a systematic analytical process. Analysis and 
corrective actions are planned in advance to optimize the availability of facilities by reducing 
downtimes, to ensure technical integrity, and to enhance knowledge and skills in performing 
hazard identification and analysis through risk assessment and effective risk management. 
The main purpose remains ensuring the highest possible HSE level and maintaining world-
class system performance”. In relation to the TIMS initiative the alliance will develop a web-
based maintenance portal giving managers, planners and decision makers access to all 
relevant maintenance information in one single interface, providing decision support and 
interoperability between actors; internally or externally. Following chapter will further present 
the TIMS maintenance portal solution. 
  
Present and Future Technical Integrity Management Practices for Integrated Operations 
 
44 
 
4 THE TIMS MAINTENANCE PORTAL  
As the industry is moving towards increasing use of condition based maintenance regimes that 
generates vast amounts of data; the need for efficient integration, handling and timely access 
to this information is becoming ever more important. Today, maintenance decision-makers 
regularly face the same problem; how to obtain the most relevant information needed for 
making the most effective decisions. In conventional maintenance, accessing and collecting 
information often consists of searching across numerous software programs and databases 
(ERP systems, IMS, CM systems, etc.). This can make information collection a time 
consuming process. When put in situations that require fast decisions, maintenance managers 
may be forced to take actions mainly based on “gut-feelings” instead of based on precise, 
updated maintenance and operation data (Moore and Starr, 2006). State of the art CBM 
regimes collect data and information from a wide range of sources, and as more and more 
technology is implemented the number of sources is also increasing. Integrating all these 
information sources into one single interface can effectively reduce the time spent searching 
for information, and instead give more time for evaluating the most effective decisions. This 
is believed to result in better decision making, optimized maintenance and inspection 
activities, increased levels of HSE and reduced production downtime. Such objectives is also 
concurrent with the main objectives for Integrated Operations (IO); “making quicker and 
better informed decisions in a distributed organization, based on right time information 
commonly available to the different disciplines independent of location throughout the field 
lifetime” (AS Document 6, 2011).  
 
The overall objective of TIMS is consequently to increase the levels of HSE, maximize 
production and predict degradations for optimized maintenance activities. Utilizing IO in this 
process; integrating inspection plans, maintenance plans and real-time condition monitoring, 
the intention is to improve maintenance planning and increase the use of CBM. Ensuring safe, 
reliable and efficient operations and effective collaboration between all involved disciplines is 
crucial. The TIMS maintenance portal will coordinate maintenance information from all the 
separated sources, allowing better sharing among different actors (plant managers, 
maintenance managers, planners, external expert consultants, etc) on different company 
levels. In the context of sustainable operations the maintenance portal will be an important 
tool for decision making based on accurate and real-time information, also considering the 
relevant components of the production process and their respective impact. The TIMS portal 
will focus on six identified performance areas to be monitored (Figure 4.1), trended and 
reported upwards towards senior management.  
 
 
Figure 4.1, Areas of focus within TIMS, Erstad (2011). 
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The TIMS system consists of three main layers (Figure 4.2); the Presentation layer (the 
maintenance portal), the Business Logic layer and the Integration Layer. The integration layer 
is formed by IBM‟s Integrated Information Core technology and will ensure that the data is 
seamlessly integrated and distributed from bottom level information sources (CM systems, 
IMS, ERP system, etc) to front-end display in the Presentation layer. The Business Logic 
layer will consist of modules that process the condition data received from the field; analyzing 
the received data, detecting deviations and aggregating higher level indicators of the technical 
condition of equipment and systems to be presented in the portal. The TIMS Portal is intended 
to provide a comprehensive view of the technical condition in different levels; from high-level 
field overview down to component level technical detail. Simplicity and convenience will be 
a key objective to the design; giving timely access to a wide range of relevant maintenance 
information sources. Users will be given role based access privileges, allowing for 
information sharing and cooperation between offshore, onshore and any external specialists. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates these three layers and also the underlying work process, to be further 
introduced in the following sections. 
  
 
Figure 4.2, TIMS structure, adapted from AS Document 7 (2011) 
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4.1 The work process 
The CMMS is the midpoint of the TIMS system, providing the reference tag structure to the 
asset management software tool (AMST). The AMST provides maintenance engineering 
inputs to RBI (static equipment) and RCM (rotating equipment) in form of risk, reliability, 
failure mode, spare parts and life cycle cost analyses. The obtained field data are compared 
against predefined expected limits. If no deviations are discovered; condition data are returned 
back to the CMMS system to update the inspection/maintenance intervals based on condition 
data. This is to achieve more dynamic inspection/maintenance planning based on real time 
monitoring of significant influence factors. If the analysis modules discover deviations in the 
condition data, the deviations will be directed to responsible personnel for manual analyses 
and forwarded for analysis in the Decision Support module. The deviations will also 
automatically be indicated in the portal interface. The Decision Support module is an expert 
system that will consider common fault modes between several units and aid the analyses in 
the Results Reporter system. The Result Reporter is a web based system that receives inputs 
from all previous analysis modules for rotating and static equipment. Based on the deviations 
recorded, the Result Reporter generates technical condition indicators for presentation in the 
portal, completing the last step of diagnosis. The Results Reporter analyses and Root Cause 
Failure Analyses (RCFA) lead to the final stage of the system, decision making and issuing 
work orders back into the CMMS, completing the loop (AS Document 7, 2011). The 
technology that forms the I&CI and backbone for data flow in the TIMS system is IBM‟s IIC 
technology. 
   
4.2 Integration Layer: The IIC 
The integration layer will ensure that all data is seamlessly integrated and distributed to front-
end display in the portal. IBM's Integrated Information Core (IIC) technology forms the 
integration layer of the TIMS system. IIC is a software framework developed for integrating 
information across multiple source systems, and is based on a reference semantic model 
(RSM) and service oriented architecture (SOA) approach. Really the key component in the 
IIC is the RSM; a model that can be used by manufacturing companies for connecting 
measurements, planning, scheduling, life cycle management etc. throughout the enterprise 
(see IBM.com). IBMs RSM is directed by the standards that form the basis of the model, 
presented in Figure 4.3. The standards are linked in a logical fashion to form an enterprise 
wide information model, to provide an abstract, formal representation of units including 
properties, relationships and the operations that can be performed on the entities.    
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Figure 4.3, IBMs IIC Conceptual Reference Semantic Model, (Erstad, 2011) 
 
Below follows a short introduction of the main standards that form the basis of the IIC: 
 
 ISA-95: International Standard for the Integration of Enterprise&Control Systems 
 The ISA-95 is an international standard for creating automated interfaces between 
enterprise and control systems. It consists of models and terminology for determining 
which information that should be exchanged between sales, finance, logistic systems and 
production, maintenance and quality systems (ISA-95.com, 2010). It has the objective of 
providing a consistent terminology to form the basis for supplier and manufacturer 
communication. The standard also aims to provide consistent information and operations 
models that lay the foundation for clarifying application functionality and information use. 
The ISA-95 is meant for global manufacturers, and designed to be applicable in all 
industries and processes; batch, continuous and repetitive processes (Wikipedia/ISA-95, 
2010).  
 
 ISA-88: International Standard for Flexibility in Production.  
 The ISA-88 is an international standard created to help industries produce in more flexible 
ways. The standard consists of terminology and models for structuring production 
processes and for developing the control of equipment, and can be applied in all production 
processes, either fully automated or completely manual (ISA-88.com, 2010). The ISA-88 
address the needs for of a universal batch control model, the difficulties in communicating 
user requirements, the integration between batch automation suppliers and difficulties in 
batch control configurations (Wikipedia/ISA-88, 2011).  
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 ISO 15926: Industrial automation systems and integration - Integration of life-cycle 
data for process plants including oil and gas production facilities.   
The ISO 15926 has been created for integration, sharing, exchange and hand-over of data 
between computer systems. The purpose of the standard is to be a common language for 
computer systems, and thereby integrating the information they produce (Wikipedia/ISO 
15926, 2011). The ISO 15926 is supposed to assure that the data model is sufficiently 
generic in order to cope with all applications through a very generic set of entities (Nystad, 
2008).  
 
In order to integrate all data sources and provide the right information to the end-user via the 
portal, the information management system must be defined with transport mechanisms, 
quality requirements and models to obtain the data needed for integrated operations of the 
platform. Once the semantic model is built the information flow is automated in the IIC; 
automatically collecting and gathering information from the individual objects (IBM, 2010). 
With multiple CM systems installed in an offshore process system, the integration layer will 
inevitably process huge amounts of data. But all this information will not be useful all the 
time; hence quality assurance of the data obtained becomes an important issue. Data fusion is 
a process for combining information and knowledge from different sources with the objective 
of maximizing the useful information content whilst minimizing the quantity of data 
ultimately retained (Starr & Ball, 2005). Therefore it is important that high quality 
information is automatically retrieved, allowing decision makers to determine which 
maintenance activities to focus resources on, optimizing return on investment (Muller, Iung, 
& Crespo-Marquez, 2007). The integration layer is the key component for providing the 
foundation for applications and analyses regarding the overall asset technical condition 
performed in the Business Logic layer. 
4.3 Business Logic Layer 
The Business Logic Layer will contain modules that process the information received from 
bottom level sources through the IIC and then aggregate technical condition performance 
indicators to be presented in the portal. One of the objectives of this thesis is to propose a way 
to aggregate a system level technical condition indicator to be visualized in the TIMS 
maintenance portal (Chapter 5). This will be done through an example of a water injection 
(WI) system. Following section will further introduce the design and functions of the 
presentation layer (the portal) to create a basis for the WI system case study in Chapter 5.   
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4.4 Presentation Layer (the Portal) 
The presentation layer forms the visual interface towards the end users. As the TIMS Portal 
has yet to be developed, this section is based on available AS documentation and inputs from 
my supervisors regarding the proposed design, layout and specifications of the portal.  
 
Similar to the presentation layer in the OSA-CBM system (Chapter 3.2.1), the design of the 
TIMS portal can be adapted according to the respective system and the user‟s requirements 
and will therefore not necessarily have one single “standard” layout. The portal is intended to 
be readable through a standard web browser and be accessed through the organizations 
intranet. The portal will provide a comprehensive view of technical information and condition 
indicators for the installations at different levels; from high-level field overview down to 
component level technical detail. Simplicity and convenience is a key objective to the design; 
giving timely access to relevant maintenance information from multiple sources (CM systems, 
process data from the IMS, ERP system) using a graphical information interface. 
 
Consequently, the portal is supposed to present technical condition indicators on various 
levels, highlighting areas that need focus and attention;  
 
 Field Level: Overview of Installations, both onshore/offshore, with performance indicators 
as depicted in Figure 4.4.   
 
 Facility Systems: Overview of the systems of the facility (Figure 4.5), presenting system 
level technical indicators aggregated from sensor/tag level measurements. The procedure 
for aggregating these system level indicators will be further addressed in Chapter 5. 
 
 Equipment level: Detailed view of systems and equipment, with access to real-time 
measurements, process conditions and aggregated performance indicators. 
 
 Instrument/Tag level: All measurements, inspection results and calculated condition 
indicators at sensor level.  
 
The portal is also meant to be a tool for optimizing and coordinating the maintenance and 
inspection activities performed among the different disciplines (static, rotating and electrical) 
in order to align interventions and thereby increase the total plant availability. Other relevant 
functional issues for the portal can be (AS Document 8, 2010): 
 
 Event management, scheduling, planning 
 Security management 
 Message and data management 
 Repositories and databases for storage of relevant information 
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Figure 4.4, Top level field view in the TIMS portal, Aker Document 8, 2010. 
 
 
Figure 4.5, System level interface in the portal, Aker Document 8, 2010. 
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The views in the portal can be tailored to fit the required needs of the end-users. Figure 4.5 
presents a proposed system view, where the system condition is visualized through indicators 
aggregated from bottom level condition measurements. The actual sensor level measurements 
could be accessed by navigating further down the hierarchy by simply clicking on the 
respective components. The process system will be presented in a virtual 3D-model, 
providing a new dimension for the communication and collaboration of maintainability data 
and real time decision-making by working in a common visual interface. 
4.4.1 Decision Support 
In addition to indicators and real time condition data, the portal will present additional 
relevant information to provide support for analyses and planning of maintenance and 
inspection activities.  Examples of such information can be: 
 
 Maintenance/Inspection procedures  
 Maintenance/Inspection history and plans  
 Operational/failure history 
 Criticality analysis 
 RBI/RCM analysis 
 Active work orders/Backlog 
 Drawings (ISO), PFDs, P&IDs,  
 Data sheets/Technical info  
 Spare Part status/tracking/availability  
 Component serial numbers 
 
The portal will be an important tool for communication and collaboration between planners, 
decision-makers and managers, including external expert centers, vendors and experts. 
Onshore and offshore activities will be considered as integrated parts of the same work 
processes, and external expert centers can be alerted and involved for assisting problem 
assessments and supporting the operation. Communication within the portal can be structured 
into tasks, activities and follow-ups with responsible roles and schedules. Users will be given 
role-based access to the portal, which allows the possibility for tailored presentation according 
to the role of the user. Managers can restrict the access of certain users (i.e. external experts, 
vendors etc), for limiting the ability to access sensitive operation data or strategic policies and 
documents. 
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5 TIMS PORTAL CASE STUDY 
As described in chapter 4, the TIMS portal shall give access to technical condition 
information and indicators at different levels of a facility; from bottom level tag/sensor 
measurements to higher level system and platform indicators. Figure 5.1 illustrates this; the 
IIC integrates information from various sources making it available for end users at different 
levels in the portal.  
 
Figure 5.1, Hierarchical Levels in the TIMS information flow, (Erstad, 2011) 
 
The objective of this case study is to propose a way for using the technical information 
coming from bottom level sources like CM sensors, process data and inspection results to 
aggregate higher level indicators visualizing system level technical condition in the portal. 
These higher level indicators are important inputs for measuring the total performance of the 
systems, the efficiency of maintenance strategies and for assisting managers and planners in 
decision making of maintenance and inspection activities. The higher levels of the TIMS 
portal will consequently measure the performance on six different contexts; HSE, Finance 
(Cost), Availability, Quality, Risk and Volume (Figure 4.1). This study will only focus on 
technical condition in the context of “Availability”. The TIMS portal will be exemplified 
through a typical - but simplified - example of a topside water injection (WI) system, 
consisting of relevant static and rotating mechanical equipment. The first section of this case 
study will introduce the methodology to be used for aggregating technical condition indicators 
through hierarchical weighting of the system‟s smaller building blocks. The methodology 
used in this study is based on the EUREKA project “Ageing Management” discussed by 
Steinebach & Sørli (1998) and Nystad (2008). 
  
Present and Future Technical Integrity Management Practices for Integrated Operations 
 
53 
 
5.1 Defining the Technical Condition  
Steinebach and Sørli (1998) defined the technical condition as “the degree of degradation 
relative to the design condition. It may take values between a maximum and minimum value, 
where the maximum value describes the design condition and the minimum value describes 
the state of total degradation”. Indicators that are only affected by changes in the plant‟s 
technical integrity will detect and point out degradations at an earlier stage compared to 
traditional indicators like regularity, environmental emissions, costs and safety statistics. 
These indicators offer little sensitivity regarding the technical condition of equipment as there 
would often be a long time between the point of actual technical degradation and the point 
where these indicators are actually alerting the management of the organization (MarinTek, 
2010). Early detection of degradations is naturally a huge advantage, giving maintenance 
managers and planners more time to evaluate the best decisions and plan the most effective 
maintenance interventions.  
 
 
Figure 5.2, Early detection through technical condition, (MarinTek, 2010) 
 
The technical condition of industrial systems is influenced by several factors during the 
operational lifetime. The main contributors are degrading mechanisms from operational loads 
(e.g. production rates, process medium characteristics, machine usage, etc) and the following 
maintenance actions for restoring the technical condition back to the desired “as good as new” 
level. As mentioned above the technical condition is defined between “design condition” and 
“total degradation”. The design state is used as a reference in order to make technical 
condition independent of the demands of the respective system in focus. As design state is a 
fixed condition usage might change over time which would complicate the ability of 
comparing a system‟s technical condition over longer periods. But defining a “perfect” or 
“totally degraded” condition is very difficult since the technical condition will vary according 
to the operating conditions and the applied context. Therefore the technical condition of a 
system should be related to a context and not be used as an expression for the absolute 
technical condition. With this, Steinebach and Sørli (1998) defined five main contexts that the 
technical condition should be related to;  
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1. Safety 
2. Environment 
3. Availability 
4. Man-hours (for maintenance) 
5. Costs 
 
Consequently, the technical condition is not evaluated as a standalone indicator, but evaluated 
according to its importance in the respective context.  
 
5.1.1 The Technical Condition Index (TCI) 
The EUREKA project “Aging Management (1996-1999)” developed and introduced a 
measure named the “Technical Condition Index” (TCI) (Nystad, 2008). The purpose of 
developing the TCI was to find a way of utilizing the increasing amount of available technical 
condition information and create a reliable variable that was only affected by the degradation 
of a system‟s technical integrity. It was determined that the technical condition can generally 
be obtained on the basis of three different information sources; measurement data from CM 
systems (online/offline), process data from the IMS and subjective reports/results from 
inspections and maintenance actions.  
 
 
Figure 5.3, Information inputs to the Technical Condition Index, Erstad (2011) 
 
The EUREKA project defined the TCI to be a value between 100 (design condition) and 0 
(total degradation). In this case the temperature of a bearing can be used as an example. An 
expert on bearings can define the acceptable limits regarding the temperature under normal 
operation. In Figure 5.4 the technical condition of the bearing is be regarded as “design 
condition” up to a temperature of 75oC. If the temperature exceeds this level, the condition is 
considered to be degraded. When the temperature reaches 120
o
C the bearing condition is 
defined as “totally degraded” and has a TCI value of 0. Between these preset limits the 
associated TCI can be obtained from relatively simple “input functions”, in this case a linear 
interpolation.   
 
Figure 5.4, Linear interpolation of TCI value according to temperature in a bearing, Erstad (2011) 
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Consequently, the obtained condition data are converted to TCIs through input functions 
comparing measurements against preset expected operational limits. The preset limits are 
defined by personnel with key knowledge to the respective equipment and the operational 
conditions, e.g. vendors or experts with solid operational experience. If the measured data 
levels are below the specified “HI” limit (Figure 5.5); the condition is considered to be “as 
good as new” (design condition). If the measurement crosses a “HIHI” limit the component is 
considered “totally degraded” and must be replaced.  
 
 
Figure 5.5, Linear relation between measurement and the TCI, (adapted from Nystad, 2008)  
 
Calculating the technical condition (TCI value) of an entire industrial system is done from a 
bottom-up approach. This means that calculations start at the lowest level (e.g. from bearing 
temperatures or probe vibration levels) and from this aggregated upwards a hierarchy 
representing the actual system. The aggregation methodology to be followed in this case study 
consists of the following steps (Steinebach and Sørli, 1998): 
 
 Establish a hierarchy of objects which represents the actual industrial system.  
 Denote a weight to each of the objects according to their criticality within the system 
 Assign relevant input variables that characterize the technical condition to the objects 
(mainly at the bottom level) 
 
The three above-mentioned steps will be further addressed in the following sections. 
 
5.1.2 Establishing the Hierarchy 
Establishing a sufficient hierarchy is an important part for technical condition aggregation and 
should be done in cooperation with experienced maintenance and operations personnel. 
Hierarchies can be established from different approaches, there is not a single method 
regarded as the right one. But it is important that the hierarchy reflects the natural connection 
between systems, functions and components. The hierarchy could be based on the existing 
hierarchy already defined in the ERP system (MarinTek, 2010), or it could be defined through 
a system or function breakdown. The functional breakdown procedure is similar to the 
procedure for Criticality Classification, presented in Chapter 2.6. This method gives a 
hierarchy with good top to bottom visibility, but a drawback is that there will be many levels 
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and also the fact that some equipments is performing more than one function and thereby will 
appear several places in the hierarchy. System breakdown is easier to establish, but will have 
a drawback by lacking links towards the function performed by the machinery (Nystad, 2008, 
Steinebach and Sørli, 1998). As both methods have their pros and cons neither method is used 
exclusively but applied where best fitted. Figure 5.6 illustrates how measurements is collected 
at lowest level, converted to TCIs through input functions and aggregated upwards through 
specific aggregation functions for obtaining and visualizing higher level technical condition. 
The most common aggregation functions will be described in the following section. At top 
level, which in this case study would be the TIMS maintenance portal, the visualization can 
be in the form of traffic lights for selected systems or sub-systems, graphs showing how 
degradation have been contributed from components on lower levels, or TCI trending over 
time (Rødseth, Mo, & Steinebach, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 5.6, Higher level TCIs aggregation, adapted from (Rødseth, Mo, & Steinebach, 2007) 
 
The benefit of such hierarchic structures is that they provide a high level view of the overall 
condition, while at the same time enable the possibility of tracking down lower level problems 
by navigating down the aggregation hierarchy. These qualities make the TCI method well 
suited for supervising complex industrial systems. After designing the hierarchy, next step is 
weighting the sub objects within the system. 
 
5.1.3 Weighting objects according to criticality 
Obtaining precise higher level TCIs through hierarchical aggregation is also dependent on a 
realistic weighting of the sub objects according to their criticality within the total system. The 
weighting process is therefore dependent on personnel with significant knowledge to the 
respective equipment and its operational behavior. Also, the weighting of objects will vary 
depending on which of the five contexts the TCI is regarded to. In relation to the safety 
context a plant can have a different technical condition than when related to the economical or 
environmental context. Associating bottom level measurement deviations with failure modes 
in the higher level hierarchical structure is a challenge of technical condition monitoring. The 
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idea of aggregating TCIs from smaller building blocks is to associate the failure modes with 
the hierarchy (Figure 5.6) and the lowest level TCIs should affect the level of degradation of 
every failure mode in the hierarchy. Weighting the significance of the different leaf node TCIs 
can be done through expert judgments, e.g. criticality index from the FMECA analysis (as 
presented in Chapter 2.7.1), or through regression parameters in regression analyses (Nystad, 
2008). However, a general advantage is to have a small amount of independent leaf node TCIs 
and that these together will reflect the technical condition in the best possible way of the 
failure mode in the hierarchy (e.g. bearing health is estimated not only from temperature 
monitoring alone, but also vibrations). As depicted in Figure 5.6; the measurements are 
converted to TCIs (input functions) and further aggregated upwards the hierarchy through 
aggregation functions. The most common aggregation functions and the only ones involved in 
this study are the weighted sum, penalty and worst case aggregation methods (Nystad, 2008):  
 
1) Weighted sum aggregation method:  
 
 Equation (1):                            
 
        
 
       
 
 TCIi is the technical condition of the leaf node i, wi is weight of the leaf node i, and n is the 
number of leaf nodes. The total sum of weights has to be equal to one.    
 
2) Penalty aggregation method: 
 Similar to the weighted sum aggregation, but here the sum of the weights are allowed to be 
different than one. 
 
 Equation (2):                           
 
        
 
       
 
 If the total TCI value obtained from the penalty aggregation method ends up being 
negative the TCI is set to zero. The total sum of weights can be unequal to one.    
 
3) Worst case aggregation method: 
 
 Equation (3):              
       
 
 The parent node is given the same TCI value as the smallest TCI value of its leaf nodes, 
similar to a chain not being stronger than its weakest link.  
 
These aggregation equations are used in various levels of the hierarchy, and will be further 
introduced and demonstrated in Section 5.5. After weighting the sub objects of system next 
step is to define the input variable at bottom level nodes. 
5.1.4 Input variables to define Technical Condition 
The best suited input variables for describing the technical condition will naturally vary 
according to the type of equipment in question. For static equipment - like pipes and vessels - 
degradations is normally occurring in a slower and much more predictable way compared to 
many of the degrading mechanisms in rotating equipments like pumps or compressors. This 
means that there is generally a higher degree and frequency of monitoring rotating equipment 
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than most static pipes and vessels. But even though the monitoring techniques and methods 
will vary between static and rotating equipment, common for both groups is that notifications; 
daily observations from plant personnel is an important source of information for assessing 
the technical condition.  
5.1.4.1 Notifications 
Notifications is the common term that includes results and reports from daily observations, 
periodic inspections and periodical preventive maintenance activities should therefore be 
quantified and also used as inputs for calculating the TCI, together with CM and process data. 
But in order to make use of these subjective inputs in correlation with the TCI; a specific 
notification procedure for reporting these deviations must be developed, as proposed by 
Nystad (2008). The idea is that as long as nothing is reported, the technical condition remains 
unchanged. If a deviation is found i.e. from visual inspection of a component, the deviation 
must be reported manually into the ERP system (e.g. SAP) by the mechanic. When the 
deviation is reported through SAP the TCI will automatically be influenced according to 
defined rules. Defined rules means that failure modes, or quantitative accept limits have been 
specified for all equipment groups (pumps, compressors, vessels, pipes, etc.), and given a 
severity grade according to expert assessments. Hence when the notification is submitted it 
contains a failure mode code related to the tag number of the particular component, and the 
TCI will be impacted according to the defined severity of the failure mode. When the 
notification is defined “Complete” the impact of the respective notification on the TCI will be 
neutralized. Consequently notifications are an important input to both static and rotating 
equipments. The subsequent sections will further specify other input valuables regarded as 
relevant for calculating TCIs of static and rotating equipment respectively.   
5.1.4.2 Static equipment  
There are a number of factors that contribute to the degradation rate of a pipeline, as shown in 
Figure 5.7. Influenced by these factors, degradation mechanisms will occur in various forms 
(corrosion, erosion, fracture and fatigue) and with various rates.  
  
 
Figure 5.7, Pipeline degradation factors, Ratnayake & Markeset (2010)  
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Over time the wall thickness of a pipe will inevitably degrade to some extent, and therefore 
inspections are performed to assess the technical condition of the pipes as a way of 
minimizing risks and avoiding unacceptable ruptures and loss of containment. The dimension 
and material selection of a pipeline is mainly based on the operating conditions (pressure, 
temperature and process medium specifications) that the pipeline is to be installed in. The 
American National Standard ASME B31.3 (Process Piping) specifies the required (Tnominal) 
and minimum (Tminimum) wall thickness levels of a pipe according to its dimension and 
classification. When in operation, the actual wall thickness can be determined through various 
non-destructive methods (visual inspection, ultrasonic testing, radiographic testing, etc) for 
measuring the degree of pipeline degradation, to detect the areas that are approaching an 
undesirable state.    
 
 
Figure 5.8, Degradation in form of reduced wall thickness, Ratnayake & Markeset (2010) 
 
Calculating the TCI of pipelines and vessels in this case study would have to be quantified in 
form of the measured wall thickness from an inspection versus the minimum allowed wall 
thickness. Immediately after installation the wall thickness Tnominal would equal to design 
condition, Figure 5.8 (TCI=100). If a pipeline‟s wall thickness reaches the virtual failure state 
it would be regarded as completely degraded and earn a TCI value of 0. Therefore this study 
will propose that the reported wall thickness of a pipe will be compared to the scale between 
design condition and state of total degradation. Between these two extremities, acceptable 
limits for each pipe class can be determined. Further a routine for including inspection 
coverage could be incorporated into the TCI. Another relevant aspect could be the monitoring 
of process data. The degradation behavior or rate will vary according to process parameters 
(Figure 5.8). Experienced personnel could specify accepted limits for process parameters of a 
pipe (e.g. temperature, pressure, etc), and if there are significant (negative) changes in the 
operating conditions this would automatically influence the TCI of a pipe, and thereby give 
the operator a warning that the area might need attention.  
5.1.4.3 Rotating Equipment 
Rotating equipment will often have periodical overhauls based on hours of operation, and 
some preventive maintenance tasks, like lubricant analyses, filter changes etc. Analyzing 
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contaminations, additives and debris in lubricants will indicate the level of wear particles 
from machine components and also indicate the condition of the lubricant itself. This will give 
better knowledge of the degradation processes occurring in the machinery, and also give 
positive environmental impacts by avoiding unnecessary oil changes. In addition to periodical 
overhauls and some preventive tasks, rotating machinery is usually the most obvious 
candidates for real time condition monitoring. CM data can be a comprehensive source of 
information, providing important knowledge regarding the technical condition of equipments. 
Measurements can consist of single value, time series or more complicated data sets 
performed at varying intervals. The rate of sampling is usually depending on the criticality 
and reliability of the respective equipment (Appendix A). Numerous sophisticated techniques 
and technologies are currently available for monitoring specific problems, and the most 
industry recognized methods will be briefly introduced in the following:  
 
Temperature monitoring: 
Temperature sensors can detect temperatures inside, or on the surface of many different 
systems, e.g. mechanical components (bearings, seals), electrical equipments, coolants, 
lubricants etc. Increasing temperatures is often signs of increasing friction, a clear sign of 
degradation.  
 
Vibration analysis: 
Measures the acceleration, velocity or displacement of moving mechanical components, and 
will give an indication of the internal status of the machinery without interrupting the process 
or containment. Excessive vibration levels can lead to audible noise, critical stresses and 
subsequent failures. Vibration measurements and analyses are able to detect lots of common 
machine faults, and the raw data are typically processed for the following: 
 
- Overall vibration levels and selected band levels, consistent with known fault types 
- Frequency spectra searching for signs consistent with many specific fault types 
- High frequency emission for rolling element bearings; processed through event counting 
and thresholding or sometimes simply banded.   
 
Also monitoring the performance of a machine, e.g. the pressure, flow rate and energy 
consumption of a centrifugal pump can be a good indicator of the total machinery health. 
Using the expected performance level of the equipment as a reference will clearly indicate if it 
isn‟t delivering what it supposed to deliver, and thereby serve as a good indicator of the 
technical condition. Today engineers often have the process data easily available, but there is 
generally little systematic monitoring of these in relation to monitoring the technical condition 
of machineries. However when detecting deviations (e.g. increasing vibrations) the process 
data are usually very relevant involve for estimating the technical condition (Appendix A). 
5.1.5 Summary of TCI aggregation methodology  
Section 5.1 have described the process to be used in this thesis for proposing a way to obtain 
the system level technical condition of a WI system; based on low level inputs aggregated 
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through a weighted hierarchy. The methodology is consequently based on the EUREKA 
project (Rødseth, Mo, & Steinebach, 2007). Here they developed a Technical Condition 
Management (TeCoMan) tool to support the TCI calculation of industrial systems.  TeCoMan 
is a software that basically uses the same methodology as described in this section, but will 
automatically calculate the TCI after the user has set up the hierarchy and defined the 
weighting of objects, input variables and acceptable limits of these. As described in Section 
4.3, the Business Logic layer will process the information from the IIC and then aggregate 
technical condition performance indicators to be presented in the portal. This case study will 
propose to adopt a similar approach for automatically calculating the TCI (from use of 
TeCoMan or similar type software) to be implemented in the Business Logic layer and then 
results are presented in the portal. The next sections will use the methodology presented to 
aggregate a system level TCI of a water injection system. This case would only present the 
methodology as a brief description to how it could be done.  
5.2 Water Injection (WI) System Description 
The methodology for obtaining higher level technical condition presented in the previous 
Section 5.1 will be used as a reference for proposing a method for visualizing the technical 
condition of a WI system. The system in focus of this study is depicted in Figure 5.9. Initially, 
water is filtered to remove solid particles, and then fed into the deoxygenation unit. This 
vessel is typically between 15-20 meters high, with the water flowing across 2-3 stages of 
tower packing, ending in a hold-up sump in the bottom of the tower. The objective of 
removing oxygen is to prevent corrosion and bacteria growth that degrades both internal 
surfaces of the system and also is unhealthy for the reservoir. Vacuum is created by a vacuum 
package consisting of a vacuum pump with ejector arrangement on the suction, drawing 
vacuum from each stage of the deaerator. Downstream the deaerator, water is fed into two 
parallel 2x50% booster pumps feeding the two parallel 2x50% single stage centrifugal WI 
pumps. All pumps of this WI system are considered to be equal; driven by high voltage 
electrical motors and having integrated utility systems (lubrication, cooling and seal systems).  
 
 
Figure 5.9, Water Injection system (Erstad, 2011)  
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All tagged components within the WI system are assigned to respective maintenance or 
inspection programs, resulting from criticality, FMECA and RBI analyses. Components like 
filters, valves, actuators, transmitters and indicators are inspected, tested, maintained and 
calibrated with periodical intervals. Static equipment (pipelines and vessels) are inspected on 
time based intervals according to the probability of failure (PoF) and consequence of failure 
(CoF) assessments performed in the RBI analysis. The rotating machinery will have some 
periodical preventive maintenance tasks (e.g. lubrication, lube oil analyses, etc.) in addition to 
vibration and temperature monitoring for early detection of degradation and imminent 
failures, (Appendix A).  
 
This case will be a simplified approach for obtaining a system level technical condition 
indicator. The components to be included in this case are the following; 
 
 2 x WI Pumps with drivers 
 2 x Booster Pumps with drivers 
 1 x Vacuum Pump with driver  
 1 x Deaeration Vessel  
 Filter package 
 Piping 
 
The main focus of this study has not been to propose realistically “correct” weighting within 
the hierarchy or aggregation calculation. This would in real life be decided through in-depth 
analyses by expert personnel. Rotating machineries are complex systems consisting of several 
sub systems that performs principal tasks for the machinery to function. For simplicity in this 
case study all pumps are considered to consist of the same components and have the same 
bottom level monitoring inputs. The lube oil, cooling and seal systems have been merged into 
a system called Utility, and the technical details of these systems will not be further specified.  
 
5.3 Defining WI system hierarchy and weighting 
The first step of the process is to define a complete system hierarchy representing the actual 
system down to lowest level parent nodes. The hierarchic structure needed for aggregating 
higher level TCIs is dependent on the respective system in focus and the desired level of 
detail. Consequently there is not a standard way of doing it. According to the system in focus 
of this case, the author identified three principal sub systems performing the required 
functions of the WI system (Figure 5.10). These systems together perform the principal 
functions that must be performed within accepted limits in order for the total technical 
condition (related to the availability context) of the system to be regarded as a satisfying state. 
However, the author realizes that with this approach it must be assumed that if the water 
treatment system does not deliver within the accepted limits (e.g. the deaerator is out of 
function and no oxygen is removed from the water) this would represent such threat to the 
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reservoir that the water injection would be stopped. In real life this would probably not be the 
case, however it is an assumption made in this case. 
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Water Injection Systemater Injection System
Pump
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System
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ater Treatment
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Figure 5.10, WI system with main sub systems (Erstad, 2011) 
 
The Water treatment system and the pump system have been given an equal amount of 
weight, as they are the most complex systems. The piping system is given a lower 
significance as the medium in this system is not considered to be of the most critical 
character; not especially corrosive and not containing any hydrocarbons. In another system 
(e.g. gas compression) with pipes containing HTHP hydrocarbons they would probably be 
given a higher significance. In relation to redundancy and parallel components the weighting 
of sub systems in this case might be argued, as the Pump system is redundant and the Water 
Treatment system is not. The weighted sum has been selected for aggregating the TCI of the 
sub systems into the TCI of for the total WI system. The following sections will present the 
lower parts of the WI hierarchy. Level 2 elements are presented one by one, before addressing 
the leaf nodes of the hierarchy. 
5.3.1 Water treatment  
The water treatment system consists of both static and rotating equipment. The water is 
filtered to remove solids and thereby minimize the erosion of internal surfaces. The oxygen is 
removed in the deaeration unit to minimize bacteria growth. The oxygen removal stage is 
dependent on a vacuum pump creating vacuum pressure inside the deaerator. As the oxygen 
level of the water is regarded as a significant factor in this case, the oxygen removal function 
is given the majority of weighting. The oxygen removal depends on vacuum inside the 
deaerator created by the vacuum pump, hence the pump has been considered more significant 
than the deaerator unit itself, in the context of delivering water with a sufficiently low level of 
oxygen. All pumps in this case is consequently assumed to be identical, consisting of four sub 
components; a pump house, gear box, driver unit, and utility systems. These components are 
weighted equally significant, although an expert on pumps most likely would have done a 
different assessment.   
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Figure 5.11, Water Treatment System with weighting (Erstad, 2011) 
5.3.2 Pump System  
The required injection pressure is dictated by the reservoir pressure, and is usually in the 
range of 150 - 300 barg. To reach this pressure the water is accelerated through two stages 
(Figure 5.9). As the water pressurizing are performed downstream the deaeration vessel which 
is working at (or close to) vacuum pressure, two low NPSH designed centrifugal booster 
pumps will build up the initial pressure required by the two centrifugal injection pumps. Once 
again a simplified weighting approach; both stages are considered equally important for 
delivering the required volume at the required pressure. 
 
 
Figure 5.12, Pump System with weighting (Erstad, 2011) 
  
Present and Future Technical Integrity Management Practices for Integrated Operations 
 
65 
 
5.3.3 WI System Piping 
Detailed RBI analyses are performed for product code-material-groups where the screening 
process has identified unacceptable risks from leakage (as explained in Chapter 2.8 on RBI 
analyses). Tags rated with identical criticality, material quality, process parameters and 
external stress/environment influence are grouped into corrosion groups and allocated a 
common probability category. The analysis identifies failure probability and consequence at 
corrosion group level, and then uses the risk matrix to allocate a risk category for each group. 
For simplifying the task of designing a hierarchy of the pipelines in this system, the piping has 
been grouped into three different corrosion groups based on the pressure of the medium they 
are containing; upstream booster pumps (Group 1), downstream booster pumps (Group 2) and 
downstream WI pumps (Group 3). Weighting/significance has been assigned according to the 
assumed criticality within the system, using the weighted sum method.  
  
 
Figure 5.13, Pipe System with weighting (Erstad, 2011) 
 
The hierarchy has now been defined down to the lowest level parent node. Next step is 
defining what types of input data could best describe the lowest level TCI. 
5.4 Defining Input Variables at bottom Level 
Consequently, after configuring the hierarchy the bottom level input variables of the system 
can be defined. This case study will define the input variables to the following components;  
 
 Filters  
 Deaerator Unit  
 Piping  
 Pumps (Vacuum, Booster, WI) 
 
Specific limits within the variables (e.g. temperature, vibration, performance limits) will not 
be considered in this case, but examples will be used where relevant. Each variable will have 
defined “HI” and “HIHI” limits, and then the equivalent TCI value can be obtained through 
input functions, the same way as already described in Figure 5.5.  
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5.4.1 Filters 
Filter TCIs will be based on pressure differential measurements indicating pressure build up; a 
sign of filter degradation or changing process environments. An acceptable range of pressure 
differential would be defined, and measurements exceeding this level would reduce the TCI. 
Also subjective reports from inspection results could be reported through notifications in SAP 
for influencing the TCI value if deviations are observed in the field. 
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Figure 5.14, Filter component TCI input variables (Erstad, 2011) 
5.4.2 Piping  
The technical condition status of the piping in the system would mainly be based on 
inspection results reported through the ERP system. As the minimum required wall thickness 
is specified in pipe specification standards, the TCI can be derived by comparing the 
measured wall thickness values against the minimum required thickness. 
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Figure 5.15, Pipe corrosion group component TCI input variables (Erstad, 2011) 
 
Also significant changes in process data should be monitored, and unacceptable limits defined 
to negatively influence the TCI. 
5.4.3 Deaerator Unit 
The technical condition of the Deaerator could be measured through inspection results in form 
of measured wall thickness, and in similar way as with pipelines a TCI value can be derived 
from these results according to the relation with minimum allowed wall thickness. From the 
assumption made regarding the significance of acceptable oxygen levels, the quantity of 
oxygen in the water downstream the deaerator unit should be measured. If this limit is 
approaching an unacceptable limit it should be reflected in the TCI, so that measures can be 
taken to improve the performance. Hence the majority of weighting is put on oxygen level 
and notifications.  
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Unit
Process Data Notifications Oxygen Level
w=0.2w=0.2 Leaf nodesLeaf nodes
Level 3Level 3
w=0.4w=0.4 w=0.4w=0.4
 
Figure 5.16, Deaerator TCI input variables (Erstad, 2011) 
5.4.4 Pumps 
The pumps represent the most complex equipment of this WI system. As mentioned earlier, 
the pumps are assumed to be of similar structure. Figure 5.17 illustrates the information 
sources that will provide inputs to the calculation of the TCI for an entire pump unit.  
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NotificationNotification
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w=0.25w=0.25
Weighted Sum
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W=0,25
W=0,25
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w=0.25w=0.25 w=0.25w=0.25 w=0.25w=0.25
w=0.5w=0.5
 
Figure 5.17, Pump Unit TCI input variables (Erstad, 2011) 
 
Notifications will impact the TCI on all sub systems of a pump. Failure modes defined in the 
FMECA analysis could be used for quantifying the significance and impact on the technical 
condition of the notification reported. The expected efficiency (input/output comparison) of 
the pump provided from vendor performance tests could be measured against actual 
efficiency, and accepted vibration and temperature levels of bearings could be quantified for 
obtaining TCIs. Oil samples will be taken at regular intervals to analyze the quality and the 
accepted levels of debris will determine the TCI.  
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5.5 Aggregating WI System TCI 
The WI system has been broken down into a hierarchy of objects, the objects have been 
weighted according to the criticality, and the relevant input variables at bottom level have 
been defined. The following sections will give a short simplified explanation to how the TCI 
value of the total WI system could be aggregated and then visualized in the TIMS portal. It is 
important that the applied aggregation methods will give a correct reflection of the impact of a 
reduced low level TCI throughout the hierarchy. The three earlier mentioned aggregation 
equations “worst case”, “penalty” and “weighted sum” are used in this thesis. Figure 5.17 
contains all of these methods and will be used as a reference in this process.  
5.5.1 Converting sensor measurements to TCIs  
The aggregation of a single TCI for the complete Booster Pump A unit (and also the entire WI 
system) will start at bottom level; detecting measurements (e.g. bearing temperatures, 
vibrations etc) and according to the preset limits a TCI for each measurement is obtained 
through an input function. The “worst case” aggregation method will be used for deriving the 
TCI from bearing temperature levels. This means that the TCI value of the parent node 
(Bearing Temperature) will be equal to the lowest registered bearing sensor value.  
 
Bearing TemperatureTemp Bearing 1 = 90 C -> TCI = 62
Temp Bearing 2 = 70 C -> TCI = 100
Worst Case
Aggregation
Worst Case
Aggregation
W=0,3W=0,3TCI = 62TCI = 62Temp Bearing 3 = 75 C -> TCI = 95
 
Figure 5.18, Obtaining TCI from "worst case aggregation" (Erstad, 2011) 
5.5.2 Obtaining TCIs from “penalty aggregation”  
Moving one level up the hierarchy (ref. Figure 5.17) the next step is calculating the TCI of the 
pump housing. Having shown the previous step, the other values are assumed to provide an 
example. The TCI value for the Pump Unit will be done through the “penalty” aggregation 
method. Here the sum of the weights is not required to be equal to one.  
 
Penalty AggregationPenalty Aggregation
Vibration
W=0,7W=0,7
TCI = 90TCI = 90
Bearing 
Temperature
W=0,3W=0,3
TCI = 62TCI = 62
Efficiency
W=0,5W=0,5
TCI = 85TCI = 85
SAP 
Notification
W=0,25W=0,25
TCI = 95TCI = 95
Pump Housing
W=0.25=0.25
TCI = 72.9T I = 72.9
 
Figure 5.19, Obtaining TCI from "penalty aggregation" (Erstad, 2011) 
 
Calculating the TCI of the pump housing through Equation 2 (penalty aggregation function): 
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                               72.9 
 
5.5.3 Obtaining TCIs from “weighted sum”  
Next step is obtaining the TCI value of the Booster Pump A using the weighted sum 
aggregation method (Equation 3). 
 
Weighted Sum Aggregationeighted Sum Aggregation
Utility 
Systems
W=0,25W=0,25
TCI = 95TCI = 95
Driver
(El. Motor)
W=0,25W=0,25
TCI = 88TCI = 88
Gear
W=0,25W=0,25
TCI = 78TCI = 78
Pump Unit
W=0,25W=0,25
TCI = 72.9TCI = 72.9
Booster Pump A
TCI = 80.98T I = 80.98
 
Figure 5.20, Obtaining TCI from "weighted sum aggregation" (Erstad, 2011) 
 
                                     
 
   
    
 
   
    
 
                                                         
                                                                                
 
The remaining aggregation up the hierarchy towards obtaining the system level TCI value 
would consist of using the weighted sum aggregation method.  
 
 
Figure 5.21, Obtaining System level TCI through "weighted sum aggregation" (Erstad, 2011) 
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5.6 Visualizing the WI System TCI in the TIMS portal 
The obtained TCIs will be visualized at different levels in the TIMS portal. The visualization 
could be presented in various ways; through a traffic light concept, system condition variation 
over time or contributions from the main sub systems over time (Figure 5.22).  
 
Figure 5.22, Examples of TCI presentation in the portal (Erstad, 2011) 
 
The technical condition indicators will serve different purposes for personnel working at 
different levels of the TIMS portal. Maintenance personnel and specialists working with 
condition monitoring on equipment and component level will have easy access to all 
measurements from CM systems (e.g. bearing temperature and vibration) and IMS system 
(process data; pressures, temperatures, flows), giving red light indications when 
measurements are deviating from preset accepted limits. This will provide the engineers with 
an overview picture of all measurements, highlighting areas that need focus and attention. The 
ability to study the behavior of the technical condition and process parameters over time will 
provide possibilities for uncovering negative trends and performance killers. The integrated 
access and the relief of manually assessing all sensor measurements will save time from data 
collection and give engineers more time to evaluate focus areas.  
 
On the higher levels of the portal (system/facility) the obtained TCIs will not serve as main 
inputs for exact condition assessments and day-to-day operational decisions. This is because 
the higher level aggregated TCIs are often obtained from complex system hierarchies that 
have many variables and uncertainties to consider. In this case a WI system consisting of a 
wide variety of equipment with very different degradation mechanisms. Therefore these 
higher level TCI values will most likely not be able to consider all of these variables perfectly 
and are consequently not 100% exact condition indicators. However the main purpose for 
these TCIs is not to be flawlessly precise but to be a tool for supporting managers and 
decision-makers over longer terms; making strategic decisions regarding maintenance, 
production, modifications and higher level revisions regarding the technical condition of the 
installations. The system indicators will also be an important tool for measuring the actual 
effect of maintenance strategy changes, modifications and can also be used for quantitatively 
comparing the performance of systems or sub-systems across different installations, if 
carefully designed.  
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6 DISCUSSION  
Based on the aspects discussed in this thesis regarding maintenance developments, CM and 
ICT technologies and future implementations of maintenance portals, the meeting with Mr. 
Gunnar Ølmheim (Head of Rotating Machinery and Condition Monitoring, Statoil) and Mr. 
Trygve Marken (Chief Engineer, Rotating Machinery, Statoil) (Appendix A) provided some 
interesting points for discussion.  
 
Maintenance Impacts from IO and ICT 
Over the last decade or so integrated operations (IO) has been recognized as an important tool 
for increasing the efficiency and safety level of O&G operations. The implementation of 
modern ICT has allowed for significant developments of maintenance activities; allowing 
onshore experts to monitor offshore assets in real time, improving the support towards 
offshore operations and personnel. This thesis has addressed some of the possibilities and 
impacts that IO and modern ICT has brought to the traditional preventive maintenance 
regimes; pushing the industry towards “predict and prevent” strategies performing 
maintenance more on a condition based basis. This development has been discussed with Mr. 
Ølmheim and Mr. Marken (Appendix A) confirming that Statoil is aiming to increase the 
amount of CBM and perform less periodical PM activities, particularly regarding rotating 
equipment. This can be further recognized as the online surveillance and CM of rotating 
equipment has increased from covering 19 to 28 installations during the last two years, and 
additionally all new projects in Statoil demands specifications for remote CM. 
 
ICT infrastructure importance for future development 
Today condition monitoring systems is generally applied for the heavy rotating equipment 
that is regarded as critical for safety and production availability. Very little online CM 
technology is applied to the static equipment on Statoil‟s installations; only limited to some 
corrosion probe monitoring. Some pilot projects have been run on online condition 
monitoring of valves but haven‟t led to significant developments in this area within Statoil. 
However it is recognized that the potential within this field isn‟t fully exploited today, and the 
reason for this comes from justifying the cost-benefit of implementation and also possibly the 
lack of a sufficient ICT infrastructure. This thesis has addressed the importance of a sufficient 
ICT infrastructure laying the foundation for implementing real time CM of offshore assets. 
The ICT infrastructure coverage on the NCS must be assumed to be under expansion when 
referring to the above mentioned increase in surveillance and demanded specification for new 
projects. As the ICT infrastructure is increasingly available the initial cost and threshold of 
implementing CM technology becomes significantly lower. Whether or not to implement new 
technologies will always come down to a cost-benefit evaluation, but as the price of 
technology decreases and the experience and effects of real time CM is growing it could be 
assumed that future real time CM systems will cover a broader range of equipments. In this 
aspect standardization is regarded as an important step for pulling the CM wagon forward.  
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Standardizing communication and interoperability protocols 
This thesis has presented some of the industry initiatives made for standardizing and 
“unifying” the information and data exchange protocols between CM technologies and 
systems. The intention of these efforts is solely meant to benefit the users of such technology, 
in the sense that standardized communication protocols will open up a wider selection of 
products available to the consumer, allowing the possibility for choosing between the best 
suited technologies instead of being limited to single vendor technologies. This can also 
contribute to lowering prices and allow more focus towards developing and optimizing the 
new maintenance possibilities instead of putting extensive amounts of energy into getting 
compatibility between devices. An additional advantage of standardization will be that 
competition will occur at a functional level and not at system or total solution level.  
 
Integrated Information Portals  
Better utilization and timely access to the increasing amount of available technical condition 
data are one of the main drivers for developing the TIMS maintenance portal presented in this 
thesis. With better utilization of the available condition data the intention is to streamline 
maintenance and inspection activities to achieve improved technical integrity and lowered 
maintenance costs. Today maintenance engineers and operators have access to a wide range 
of real time technical and operational data; however they are scattered between separate 
systems and databases. From Mr. Marken it was stated that the combined use and access to 
the available data isn‟t optimal with current implemented CM systems. In Statoil the 
maintenance engineers browse through CM data for all equipment every 24 hours; searching 
for deviations and negative developments. Process data is not systematically included and 
monitored in this routine, however when detecting deviations (e.g. increasing vibrations) they 
are usually very relevant to be involved for estimating the technical condition of the 
equipment. In lack of a total system solution that integrates information from all relevant 
sources into one single interface; time consuming manual work is needed to collect all 
relevant data. From this it is recognized that utilizing integrated systems providing timely and 
effective access to multi source maintenance data could save the engineers a lot of time by 
significantly reducing the need for working between multiple systems. As presented in this 
thesis, the TIMS portal is intended to consist of a Business Logic layer for processing the 
obtained maintenance data to generate traffic lights for visualizing negative developments. 
From Mr. Marken and Mr. Ølmheim it has been recognized that the future lies in 
implementing systems that includes both CM and process data for assessing the technical 
health of machineries, and with more automated deviation detections the need for manual 
browsing of vast amounts of data will be significantly reduced. Having a clear overview of 
deviating measurements will give possibilities for special focus on the areas that need 
attention.   
 
Condition indicators for management support  
Consequently the TIMS portal will be used as a tool for maintenance engineers working with 
day to day condition assessments and decisions regarding maintenance and inspection 
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activities. But on higher levels the TIMS portal is also meant to support the organization‟s 
management in the longer strategic terms. Chapter 6 of this thesis proposed a methodology for 
visualizing the technical condition from indicators aggregated from lowest level input 
variables. The methodology proposed in Chapter 6 addressed system condition visualization 
in the aspect of availability, but the same methodology could be used to aggregate 
performance indicators according to all the defined main focus areas of the TIMS portal 
(Figure 4.1).  
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7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
With ever more stringent requirements for HSE and production availability, the operators 
wish to have knowledge regarding the technical condition and degradation mechanisms at 
their fingertips to best avoid adverse events and unplanned production shutdowns. In 
discussions with Statoil maintenance engineers (Appendix A) regarding today‟s CM systems 
it has been confirmed that there is need for better utilization and timely access to the different 
technical condition data available. Also as the quantity of condition data from monitoring 
systems could be expected to increase, the need for efficient handling and access to this 
information becomes ever more important. Such needs for integrated access is a key factor in 
developing the TIMS maintenance portal; making maintenance decision makers and managers 
spend less time collecting information and instead give more time evaluating decisions.  
 
The TIMS maintenance portal presented in this thesis will provide comprehensive access to 
maintenance information from bottom level sensors to platform and field level. The intention 
is to provide a clear total picture, utilizing technical condition and process data to detect 
deviations; indicating abnormal measurements, reducing the need for time demanding data 
collection and searching for negative developments. Monitoring significant influence factors 
like process parameters and technical condition data in the portal will facilitate for optimized 
and coordinated maintenance and inspection activities based on real time information.  
 
The aggregation of higher level technical condition indicators can be a valuable support for 
managers to measure the performance of the maintenance strategies, effect of strategic 
changes and for pointing out performance killers and bad actors. The methodology proposed 
in Chapter 6 can be used for measuring the performance of all main areas of focus in the 
TIMS portal; HSE, finance, availability, quality, risk and volume.  
 
When considering the complexity and risks of performing offshore O&G operations it is clear 
that operational decisions and technical condition assessments is unlikely to be based on 
artificial intelligence in any near future. Even though technology developments have come a 
far way, the safest and most efficient decisions are still made by experienced personnel base 
their actions on precise, updated information material. Hence it is important to use the 
technology where it‟s best appropriate; developing system technologies that provides the 
decision makers with the most accurate condition data in a timely and effective manner 
creating the best possible foundation for well considered decisions. 
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APPENDIX A: MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Subject: Maintenance and Condition Monitoring of Rotating Equipment 
Date: 12.04.2011 
Location: Statoil‟s facilities at Sandsli, Bergen. 
 
Participants:  
Gunnar Ølmheim  (Head of Rotating Machinery and Condition Monitoring, EPN JO  
   MFO RCM Statoil ASA) 
 
Trygve Marken (Chief Engineer, Rotating Machinery, MFO RCM OWE Statoil ASA)  
 
Christian Erstad  (University of Stavanger) 
 
Anja Farstad   (University of Oslo) 
 
Main topics of discussion: 
 
1. Current level of condition monitoring (CM) and condition based maintenance (CBM) of 
(mainly) rotating equipment. 
 
2. Future directions for CBM and increasing use of real-time data as basis for performing 
maintenance activities. 
 
Summary: 
 
Online CM is mostly applied on heavy rotational equipment that can be described as critical 
equipment in regards to Safety (e.g. fire water pumps) or Production (turbines, generators, 
compressors, water injection pumps). Vibration and temperature levels of bearings is 
generally the most applied online monitoring methods for rotating equipment. The rate of 
sampling varies between different CM systems and also with the criticality of the respective 
equipment. All systems are checked every 24 hrs to detect deviations. Software alarms will 
indicate developments to onshore personnel at an earlier stage than for the operators offshore, 
so that the onshore personnel are given more time to evaluate conditions and plan potential 
maintenance interventions. The engineers also have easy access to a wide range of process 
data (pressures, flow rates, temperatures) but as of today there is no systematic monitoring of 
these in relation to monitoring the technical condition of machineries. However when 
detecting deviations (e.g. increasing vibrations); process data are usually very relevant to be 
involved for estimating the technical condition. Consequently there is no total system for this, 
so engineers are working between different systems to collect these data. As an example there 
is one particular system for collecting flow data, but it demands a bit of manual work to select 
the desired tags to collect data from, and this procedure can often be time consuming. By 
having automatic systems that would automatically perform this kind of data collection could 
save the engineers a lot of time.  
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The organization is aiming to move towards less periodical preventive maintenance activities 
and perform more condition based maintenance, particularly on the rotating equipment. Over 
the last two years surveillance of equipment has expanded from 19 to 28 installations.  
 
Very little CM is performed on static equipment, mostly inspections and some corrosion 
probe measurements. Condition monitoring of valves have been performed to some smaller 
extent; in the form of acoustic measurements to detect leakage. Some pilot projects on this 
subject have been run in cooperation with Solberg Andersen. But there has not been a 
significant development on this aspect within Statoil as it is regarded to involve relatively 
expensive equipment. It all comes down to a cost benefit evaluation. Control valves are 
equipped with a lot of different sensors; regulators and flow controllers that could extract a 
wide range of valve data which could be communicated towards a CM system. However, as 
of today the potential is not fully exploited in this field. The reason for this can be the missing 
infrastructure for the online condition monitoring of valves. Once again this will stem back to 
the cost benefit evaluations; why spend a sum of money on monitoring a valve when the 
whole valve could be demounted and replaced for half the monitoring sum?  
 
Predictive maintenance systems are the next generation of systems; considering a wider range 
of data sources, both technical condition data and process data to determine the health of the 
machineries. By pre-setting accepted operational limits the system will generate alarms if 
detecting deviations. The future lies in implementing systems that give red light indications 
when negative developments are registered, to remove the need for engineers having to 
browse through specialist systems searching for negative developments. Future lies in 
collecting data from a wide range of data sources automatically, and then be provided with an 
overview picture which is easier to relate to. Even though the development of CM systems 
and expert systems has come a far way, the decisions are still made by humans using 
computer technology as tools for making more effective and successful decisions. When 
looking at industries like aviation and nuclear power; they might be the industries that really 
are sitting at the tip of this technology, but even in these industries it is still humans making 
the final decisions.  
 
Some of the older, marginal installations of Statoil will never be susceptible to CM on “not so 
critical” components like pipes or valves. However all new projects in Statoil demand 
specifications for CM.  
 
It will always be a matter of cost benefit, even though the technology is sophisticated and 
revolutionary.  
